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Since September 11, 2001, many governments have considered developing 
national identity management systems. Beyond identification, politicians and proponents 
of these systems have touted such system benefits as combating terrorism, preventing 
identity theft, facilitating travel, and combating illegal work and benefit fraud. For these 
reasons, the United States and United Kingdom both considered variations of these 
systems. While the United Kingdom passed the Identity Cards Act of 2006 and spent 
several years developing a national identity management system before ultimately 
scrapping the scheme in 2010, the United States sought to secure further the existing 
means of identification—driver’s licenses and identity cards—through the passage of the 
REAL ID Act. Both measures met with widespread resistance. 
What does an examination of resistance to nationwide identity management 
schemes in the United States and United Kingdom reveal about the nature of national 
identity management systems and identity cards, and what does this resistance tell 
policymakers and security officials who promote such schemes? Through a comparative 
analysis of the REAL ID Act implementation and the National Identity Scheme, this 
thesis shows that Anglophone, common-law nations experience the same inhibiting 
factors, whether or not they attempt to implement a national identity management system 
or an identity card on a national scale. 
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Since September 11, 2001, many governments have considered developing 
national identity management systems. Beyond identification, politicians and proponents 
of these systems have touted such system benefits as combating terrorism, preventing 
identity theft, facilitating travel, and combating illegal work and benefit fraud. For these 
reasons, the United States and United Kingdom both considered variations of these 
systems. While the United Kingdom passed the Identity Cards Act 2006, and spent 
several years developing a national identity management system before ultimately 
scrapping the scheme in 2010, the United States sought to further secure the existing 
means of identification—driver’s licenses and identity cards—through the passage of the 
REAL ID Act. However, significant backlash has resulted from state governments in 
implementing the requirements of the Act. 
The question this thesis explores is what does a comparative examination of 
resistance to nationwide identity management schemes in the United States and United 
Kingdom reveal about the nature of national identity management systems and identity 
cards? What does this resistance tell policymakers and security officials who promote 
such schemes?  
The literature suggests that a variety of terms is used to describe national identity 
management. While the terms “identity cards” and “identity management systems” have 
been favored, these terms have complex definitions and assumptions associated with 
them. For this reason, a number of opinions have been proffered about whether the REAL 
ID-compliant driver’s licenses and identity cards constitute a national ID card or could be 
considered part of a national identity management system. The variation in terminology 
obscures the fact that identity cards that are national in scope face the same problems and 
issues as those experienced by national identity management systems. Through a 
comparative analysis of the REAL ID Act implementation and the National Identity 
Scheme, this thesis shows that Anglophone, common-law nations experience the same 
inhibiting factors, whether or not they attempt to implement a national identity 
management system or an identity card on a national scale. 
 xiv
Advocacy groups, academics, and even politicians have objected to parts of both 
schemes based on similar purpose, privacy, and civil rights and civil liberties concerns. 
They warned that the schemes might not be able to fulfill their proposed purposes and 
have expressed concern over a variety of privacy issues, including the potential for 
function creep, the security and integrity of data collected for the schemes, the 
implications of linking databases together, and the effects of increased collection and 
sharing of data. Advocacy groups and academics also expressed concern over the 
potential for increased civil rights and civil liberties violations based on the data 
collected. They worried that the schemes could plausibly increase racial profiling and 
discrimination, through stops and searches or through the possible inclusion of race on 
the identity cards in the United States, where the cards’ lack of encryption creates the risk 
that commercial entities could collect and use personal data. Furthermore, the concern 
that the nationwide use of identity cards fosters a surveillance society, and facilitates the 
practices of data mining and profiling, is shared by groups in the United States and 
United Kingdom. 
Academics in the United States and United Kingdom asserted similar concerns 
regarding the development of their respective legislation. They believed that the process 
was either too accelerated to allow for public debate or that it was flawed, as the design 
and functional components of the scheme had been decided up front. Both schemes have 
similarly high levels of public acceptance, until it is brought to the attention of the 
participants how the schemes will actually function. Finally, the United States and United 
Kingdom have similar inclinations to reject identity management schemes, identity cards, 
or identifiers based on a varied history of associated personal privacy and civil liberties 
concerns.  
The parallel inhibiting factors experienced by both schemes demonstrate that 
while some do not consider the United States’ REAL ID Act to be a national identity 
management system—and thus may not think of REAL ID-compliant driver’s licenses 
and identity cards as national ID cards—the nomenclature used to describe the policy 
does not matter when it comes to issues surrounding identity management that must be 
negotiated and overcome. Whatever the name, whatever the architecture, government 
 xv
systems built to identify the citizenry of a national will face significant resistance. United 
States policymakers must consider the inhibiting factors that face national identity 
management schemes in Anglophone, common-law nations when implementing 
nationwide identity cards, lest they fall into the trap of believing that the same issues will 
not appear. Only with this foresight in mind, will the United States be able to formulate 
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A country’s ability to identify its citizens has always been important to modern 
governments, but the issue has become much more pressing in the Internet age, when a 
person’s digital identity can be a primary method of obtaining goods and services from—
and access to—both private and public organizations.  
Particularly since September 11, 2001, many governments have considered 
developing national identity management systems. Beyond identification, politicians and 
proponents of these systems have touted such benefits as combating terrorism, preventing 
identity theft, facilitating travel, and combating illegal work and benefit fraud. For these 
reasons, the United States (U.S.) and United Kingdom (U.K.) both considered variations 
of these systems. The United Kingdom passed the Identity Cards Act of 2006 and spent 
the next four years developing a national identity management system before ultimately 
scrapping the scheme in 2010. In contrast, the United States considered developing such 
a system, but ultimately decided not to. Instead, the United States sought to further secure 
the existing means of identification—driver’s licenses and identity cards—through the 
passage of the REAL ID Act. Still, privacy and civil liberties advocates and some 
academics have characterized this measure as tantamount to the creation of a de-facto 
national identification card for the United States. Opponents of national identity 
management systems have responded in a similar sentiment.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The question this thesis is seeking to answer is what does a comparative 
examination of resistance to nationwide identity management schemes in the United 
States and United Kingdom reveal about the nature of national identity management 
systems and identity cards? What does this resistance tell policymakers and security 
officials who promote such schemes? 
The answer to these questions will help to explain why the United States is 
experiencing backlash from state governments in implementing the requirements of the 
REAL ID Act. To answer the question, this thesis explores the inhibitors for the U.S.’ 
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REAL ID Act implementation, as well as arguments against the U.K.’s National Identity 
Scheme (NIS) that ultimately prevented its implementation.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Discussions of national identity management systems in the United States and 
United Kingdom were invigorated after September 11 as a way to prevent and combat 
terrorism. These common-law countries, which share similar security concerns, believed, 
at least for a while, that a national identity management system would mitigate some of 
the threats facing the countries. For example, 13 of the terrorists and conspirators 
responsible for the September 11 attack had fraudulently obtained ID cards, and four of 
the hijackers boarded the planes they later took control of using U.S. driver’s licenses.1  
In addition to increased security, both countries also identified other benefits of a 
national identity management system. For example, a single identification card would 
prevent an individual from obtaining duplicate identifying documents. This measure, in 
turn, could reduce benefit fraud by preventing individuals from applying for assistance 
multiple times. It also might stop employment fraud by preventing undocumented 
immigrants from accepting jobs. Additionally, in the United Kingdom, a system was 
promoted as a way to facilitate easier delivery of services to citizens. No longer would a 
citizen have to apply for benefits and services in multiple places; the national identity 
management system would allow information to be shared across departments and 
agencies. These benefits, combined with the potential to increase security, made national 
identity management systems an attractive solution to the increasing terrorist threat. 
The United Kingdom began work on an identity management system in 2006. 
Throughout the system’s development, the government faced criticism from academia, as 
                                                 
1 Joint Hearing Before The Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims and The 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of The Committee on The Judiciary House of 
Representatives, Risk to Homeland Security from Identity Fraud and Identity Theft, 107th Congress, 2 
(2002), 2; Anna Ya Ni and Alfred Tat-Kei Ho, “A Quiet Revolution or a Flashy Blip? The Real ID Act and 
U.S. National Identification System Reform,” Public Administration Review 68, no. 6 (2008): 1069; Nawaf 
al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar obtained driver’s licenses in California, while Mohamed Atta and Ziad 
Jarrah obtained licenses in Florida. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004), 220, 
231. 
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well as privacy and civil rights advocates, for a variety of reasons related to cost, 
technology, privacy, and security. This criticism continued until the scheme was 
disbanded in 2010. 
In contrast, the United States chose not to implement a national identity 
management system. Instead, based on a 9/11 Commissions Report recommendation, the 
government sought to strengthen driver’s licenses to increase their security and integrity. 
Since its passage in 2005, the REAL ID Act has faced significant resistance, and 
implementation has been wrought with political battles. As a result, the timeline for 
enforcing state compliance with the requirements of the Act has been repeatedly delayed 
and the requirements themselves reduced. 
While a significant amount of scholarly analysis of the U.K. identity management 
system and its dissolution is available, the U.S. forays into national identity management 
discourse have been studied less. Further, little comparative analysis of nationwide 
identity management systems beyond those established in continental Europe has been 
conducted. This thesis contributes to a greater understanding of the principles held by 
common law countries, as well as the cultural differences that make each country’s 
analysis and decisions regarding national identity management unique. It also delves into 
the ambiguity in the literature about the differences between national identity 
management systems and identity cards, and how that ambiguity manifests itself when it 
comes to policy implementation. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review introduces the nomenclature used when discussing national 
identity management systems, different models for how identity management systems 
can be organized, and different architecture for how identity management systems can be 
structured. This information provides a foundation for further discussion of the U.S. and 
U.K. identity management schemes explored in Chapter II. 
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1. Identity Management System Nomenclature 
The relevant literature uses a myriad of terms to designate national identity 
management, most commonly national identity management system, or national ID cards. 
Many scholars fail to define these terms in their articles, assuming that the reader 
understands what these are and how they function in a greater context. However, a level 
of ambiguity surrounds what these terms actually mean. With the variety of different 
descriptors, it is not easy for the reader to discern the difference or similarities between 
the terminologies. In the book, IDs—Not That Easy: Questions about Nationwide 
Identity, authors Kent and Millett summarize this lack of clarity: 
There is no recognized universal model for a nationwide identity system. 
Because different people mean different things when they discuss the 
concept, evaluating it requires clarification of what is intended. The range 
of possibilities for identity systems is broad and includes alternative 
approaches.2 
Delving into the different terminology yields insights into the parameters of 
discourse surrounding national identity management. Kent and Millett intentionally favor 
the unique phrasing of “nationwide identity system.” They explain the intentional use of 
term “nationwide” instead of “national” so that the word indicates the scope of the 
system, without misleading the reader in terms of the scope of the population within the 
database, which may extend beyond citizens. Further, they explain that “system,” in this 
context, “implies linking together of many social, legal, and technological components in 
complex and interdependent ways.”3 This definition comes without entering into a 
discussion of the technical architecture. 
Kent and Millet specifically define approaches to a nationwide identity system in 
terms of the scope of the population included. With a U.S.-centric view, they state that 
approaches to a system could include information solely on U.S. citizens, non-citizens, or 
just parts of the country’s population.4 Further parameters used to define an identity 
                                                 
2 Stephen T. Kent and Lynette I. Millett, IDs—Not that Easy: Questions about Nationwide Identity 
Systems (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002), 8. 
3 Ibid., 11–13. 
4 Ibid., 8–9. 
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system are the purpose of the system, the scope of the data, the user(s) of the system, the 
types of uses, whether it would be voluntary or mandatory, and the legal structures.5  
Another unique, and more commonly European descriptor for national identity 
management, is “national identification scheme” (NIDS), used by authors Clement, 
Guerra, Johnson, and Stalder. This terminology refers to systems defined by their 
architectural designs, which may include identity cards, databases, identifiers, and/or 
biometrics.  
Alternatively, scholars Kubicek and Noack use the terms “electronic identity” 
(eID) and “eID Management Systems” (eIDMS) in their analysis of the systems within 
eight different European countries that planned to use IDs for “online authentication for 
e-government services [services offered by the government over the Internet] based on a 
national ID card or a similar chip-card.”6 They define an eID as identifiers “registered in 
national citizen registries based on a particular legislation and produced and distributed 
within an eID eIDMS operated by different agencies.”7 Their review of the systems 
provides insight into an interesting limitation of defining characteristics of national eIDs 
on a broader scale: 
The only common feature of the national eIDs in the eight countries is 
their organization from the national citizen registries, based on an 
obligation to register for every citizen by birth.8 
Many of the differences identified between the different country’s systems related 
to eID issuance and technical design. Kubicek and Noack found that banks, rather than 
the government, issued the eIDs in four of the northern European countries analyzed, 
primarily because those countries demonstrated a much higher trust in the privacy 
provided by the banking system.9 They also found that some countries had central 
                                                 
5 Kent and Millett, IDs—Not that Easy: Questions about Nationwide Identity Systems, 9–11. 
6 Herbert Kubicek and Torsten Noack, “Different Countries-Different Paths Extended Comparison of 
the Introduction of eIDs in Eight European Countries,” Identity in the Information Society 3, no. 1 (2010): 
236. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 237. 
9 Ibid., 240, 242. 
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“registers,” or databases, rather than local registers, among other architectural 
differences. Almost in an acknowledgement of the unique terminology of eID and 
eIDMS, and despite using neither term, Kubicek and Noack’s article includes the 
keywords: “identity cards” and “identity management systems,” illustrating the ubiquity 
of this phraseology. 
Legal professor Daniel J. Steinboch favors the term “national identity cards” in 
his article, “Fourth Amendment Limits on National Identity Cards,” acknowledging that 
they would likely be the heart of a U.S. national identity management system. This 
assertion in itself reveals a level of understanding about how identity cards fit within a 
greater system, while not necessarily being a required piece of the design. Steinboch 
describes national identity systems in the context of their most basic purpose—human 
identification—and relies on the definition created by scholar Richard Clarke: “[H]uman 
identification is the association of data with a particular human being.”10 
Steinboch further acknowledges that a national identity management system relies 
on particular designs elements to function: “Any such system, however, depends on two 
major features: the database (or databases) containing information about particular 
individuals and the means to connect a given person with that information.”11 
2. Identity Management System Models 
The terminology associated with national identity management outlined 
previously has relied on some combination of structure or design of the system, the scope 
of population within the system, and/or the function of the system. However, in addition 
to simply defining the overarching terms for these schemes, academics have developed 
different models to differentiate identity management schemes. Academic scholars, Ya 
Ni and Tat-Kei Ho, conduct a comparison between a centralized, data clearinghouse, or 
federated approach to identity management reform in the United States, as opposed to the 
                                                 
10 Richard Clarke, “Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public 
Policy Issues,” Information Technology & People 4, no. 7 (December 1994), 6–37, http://www.rogerclarke. 
com/DV/HumanID.html. 
11 Daniel J. Steinbock, “Fourth Amendment Limits on National Identity Cards,” in Privacy and 
Technologies of Identity: A Cross-Disciplinary Conversation, ed. Katherine J. Strandburg and Daniela Stan 
Raicu (New York: Springer U.S., 2006), 297. 
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current REAL ID framework. A centralized approach would consist of a national ID card 
and a single database “controlled by a central authority,” which would be the federal 
government.12 Ya Ni and Tat-Kei Ho describe this approach as one taken by many 
European and Asian countries.13 The data clearinghouse approach entails developing 
interoperability, “the ability of two or more systems or components to exchange 
information and to use the information that has been exchanged,” between existing state 
and federal databases, coupled with a single federal data-clearing house.14 The federated 
approach involves standardizing existing state driver’s license systems, while allowing 
the states to manage their own systems.15 
In a more generic approach, Miriam Lips describes an identity management 
system schema entirely based on who manages the data. The identity management system 
can either be organization-centric, in which a service provider manages the data, or user-
centric, in which the user manages their own data.16 Similarly, researchers Hansen et al. 
describe two models that are also based on data management. One model is the 
centralized identity model, in which the identity management system manages a user’s 
identity for them.17 The other model is the federated identity model, in which either no 
single identity management provider exists or the users manage their own identity.18 
Another set of researchers, Halperin and Backhouse and Fritsch, Fuglerud, and 
Solheim, describe identity management systems identified during the Future of Identity in 
the Information Society (FIDIS) European research project based on use and user control. 
                                                 
12 Anna Ya Ni and Alfred Tat-Kei Ho, “A Quiet Revolution or a Flashy Blip? The Real ID Act and 
U.S. National Identification System Reform,” Public Administration Review 68, no. 6 (2008): 1065. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 1066; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, IEEE Standard Computer 
Dictionary: A Compilation of IEEE Standard Computer Glossaries (New York: The Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers, 1991), 114. 
15 Ya Ni and Tat-Kei Ho, “A Quiet Revolution or a Flashy Blip? The Real ID Act and U.S. National 
Identification System Reform,” 1067. 
16 Miriam Lips, “The Quest for Managing Identity Management,” Online Information Review 33, no. 3 
(2009). 
17 Marit Hansen et al., “Privacy-Enhancing Identity Management,” Information Security Technical 
Report 9, no. 1 (2004): 41.  
18 Ibid. 
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They found that three different types of existing identity management systems are on the 
market today: identity management systems (IdMS) for accounting or account 
management, IdMS for profiling, and user-controlled IdMS.19 
3. Identity Management System Architecture 
Amid the swirl of names, notions, and models of national identity management, 
the literature really boils down to discussions of either a card or a system. For the purpose 
of this thesis, cards and systems, collectively, are referred to as the primary identity 
management schemes. Articles using system terminology usually describe an identity 
management architecture involving an identity card and a centralized database, although 
it is not necessarily the only way a system can be designed. A card and database was the 
design of the U.K.’s scheme until it was repealed.  
The other way national identity management architecture is conceptualized is 
simply based on identity cards. This architecture does not always involve centralized 
databases. Often, the identity card is discussed as being may be voluntary or mandatory, 
and can be administered and mandated by the nation or by federated states, which have 
some degree of governmental authority and reserved powers.  
The problem with the dichotomy that appears in the literature is that it obscures 
the fact that identity management schemes can be structured using a variety of different 
components. Kent and Millett state: 
An idea that has resurfaced as a result of the [September 11th] attacks is 
the creation of a “national identity card,” often referred to simply as a 
“national ID.” This term is a bit of a misnomer, in that a card would likely 
be but one component of a large and complex nationwide identity system, 
the core of which could be a database of personal information on the U.S. 
population. 
While Kent and Millett note the intersections that exist between an identity card 
and an identity management system, the majority of the literature is not entirely clear 
where that overlap exists. Cards can be a part of a system, but they are often divorced 
                                                 
19 Ruth Halperin and James Backhouse, “A Roadmap for Research on Identity in the Information 
Society,” Identity in the Information Society 1, no. 1 (2008): 77. 
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from their connection to information systems in the literature. The term “information 
system” may be referring simply to a computer system or more broadly to the 
interconnecting system of people and technology that allows information to be shared.20 
The literature may refer to the inherent issues with identity cards or the problems that can 
be found in identity management systems, but it is not always clear in individual articles 
what elements constitute each design. While a system is often thought of as a database, 
ultimately, ID cards are part of a system. They both involve a number of interconnected 
design elements that make them function. 
Simplifying the design elements of both an ID card and an identity management 
system would include: 
 An Identifier—A unique number belonging to a single individual or a 
biometric: “a measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and 
behavioral characteristic that can be used for automated recognition.”21 
 Database—The infrastructure where an identifier or biometric, as well as 
other personal data, may or may not be stored. The data can either be 
centralized in one single repository, or separated into different repositories 
that may be connected through interoperability. 
 Physical Token—An object on which an identifier or biometric may or 
may not be held or displayed. An example would be an identity card. 
In addition to these strictly architectural components, the model can either be 
voluntary or mandatory.  
These elements can be combined into a number of different combinations, as 
described by Clement et al. in their paper on “National Identification Schemes,” 
depending on whether the physical token (ID card) is required to be presented, and what 
data is on the ID card and/or in the database.22 Some of the combinations include: 
                                                 
20 Bernd Hornung, “Information System,” Principia Cybernetica Web, accessed August 15, 2015, 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/INFORM_SYSTE.html. 
21 “Biometrics Glossary,” accessed January 12, 2015, http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/ 
Glossary.pdf. 
22 Andrew Clement et al., “National Identification Schemes (NIDS),” in Human Choice and 
Computers: Issues of Choice and Quality of Life in the Information Society, ed. Klaus Brunnstein and 
Jacques Berleur, vol. 98 (Boston, MA: Springer US, 2002), 198. 
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 Unique identifier (identity number), no physical token (no ID card), and 
database 
In this design, a unique ID number is assigned to an individual for 
identification purposes. That number is also maintained in a database, 
which is currently how the Social Security Number (SSN) is structured 
within the United States. The paper card is not considered a physical 
token, per say, since the use of the card is not required in this model. 
 Unique identifiers (identity number and biometrics), physical token (ID 
card), and centralized database 
In this design, the ID number and biometrics are maintained both in and 
on the ID card and in the database, which is how the U.K. NIS was to be 
structured. It would have consisted of a unique identifier (the National 
Identity Registration Number), and ID card with an encrypted chip inside 
that would hold the biometrics, and a central database called the “National 
Identity Register.”23 
  
                                                 
23 “Identity Cards Scheme Will be Axed ‘within 100 Days’,” last updated May 27, 2010, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8707355.stm; Identity Cards Act 2006, Chapter 15, Section 2, Sub-section 27, 2006, http:// 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/15/notes/division/5/1/2. 
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Figure 1.  UK National ID Card: Key Features Explained 
 
 
1. Symbol meaning a chip is embedded in the card 
2. ID card number 
3. Citizenship. Foreign nationals in the UK are being given different cards. 
4. Place of birth 
5. Signature - digitally embedded in the card 
6. Date of card issue and date it becomes invalid 
7. Photo taken to biometric standards 
8. Biometric chip holds fingerprint record 
9. Swipe zone. Information which can be automatically read by computer 
Source: “Identity Cards Scheme Will be Axed ‘within 100 Days,’” last modified May 27, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8707355.stm.; Identity Cards Act 2006, Chapter 15, Section 2, 
Sub-section 27, 2006, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/15/notes/division/5/1/2. 
 12
 Unique identifier (identity number), physical token (ID card), and 
separate databases 
The identity number may appear on the ID card and in the database, which 
is how the driver’s license is structured in the United States. Each 
individual who receives a license is assigned a unique license number that 
is printed on a card and maintained in the state’s Department of Motor 
Vehicles (DMV) database.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN/METHODOLOGY 
This thesis proves that Anglophone, common-law nations experience the same 
inhibiting factors, whether or not they attempt to implement a national identity 
management system or a nationwide identity card, by conducting a comparative case 
study of the inhibiting factors and tensions pertaining to REAL ID compliant driver’s 
license and identity cards in the United States, as mandated by the REAL ID Act, and the 
NIS in the United Kingdom. It explores the reasons why the United States and the United 
Kingdom experienced opposition to the implementations to these efforts. The United 
Kingdom was chosen for this research because of its similar legal system, language, and 
dedication to protecting the privacy and civil liberties of its citizens. 
This thesis includes a qualitative analysis to identifying common themes using 
primary and secondary source documents including testimony from congressional 
hearings on the REAL ID Act; public consultation documents regarding the U.K. identity 
card; legislative publications for both the United Kingdom and the United States; 
academic studies and academic journal articles discussing identity management 
architectures, technology, privacy, and public acceptance and attitudes towards both 
identity management systems and ID cards; articles that conduct comparisons of national 
identity management systems and analysis of the U.K. and U.S. legislation and their 
implementation; and white papers and press releases authored by advocacy groups. These 
sources help to trace the primary reasons for the countries’ aversion to developing 
identity management schemes. 
The scope of this research does not include a discussion of national identity 
management systems not directly related to these two countries. This thesis does not 
evaluate the effectiveness of a system at achieving the proposed purposes, nor does it 
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analyze the validity of the arguments against a national identity scheme. It does not 
include a comprehensive legal analysis. A full review of all identity documents used by 
the countries over the course of their history also is outside of the scope of this analysis. 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The second chapter provides an in-depth look at both the REAL ID Act and the 
Identity Cards Act of 2006. The requirements of both Acts are described, as well as the 
associated statutory purposes. In addition, a discussion of what both schemes constitute in 
terms of a national identity management system, a national ID card, both, or neither.  
The third chapter begins comparing opposing arguments to both the REAL ID Act 
implementation and the National Identity Scheme. It provides a comparison of the policy 
and privacy issues. The fourth chapter compares civil rights and civil liberties issues 
voiced by advocacy groups, politicians, and academia.  
The fifth chapter provides a comparison of the issues involved in public 
engagement and government transparency, as well as a discussion of the levels of public 
acceptance. Finally, it provides a comparison of the cultural and historical factors that 
inform current identity management system approaches.  
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the implications of the comparative 
analysis and how it impacts policymakers. 
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II. UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM’S IDENTITY 
MANAGEMENT SCHEMES  
This chapter outlines the United States’ REAL ID Act, specifically what is 
required by the law and the purposes for the creation of the legislation. The chapter then 
provides an overview of the various competing schools of thought on what the legislation 
means in terms of national identity management. It explores arguments as to whether or 
not the REAL ID Act constitutes a national identity management system, a national 
identity card, both, or neither. The chapter also provides an overview of the United 
Kingdom Identity Cards Act. It explains the components of the legislation, as well as its 
intended purposes. This section of the chapter also covers the general views on whether 
or not the scheme is a national identity management system, a national identity card, 
both, or neither.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary background on the 
legislation of both countries, the implications of which are explored in later chapters.  
A. UNITED STATES—REAL ID ACT 
Following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, released in 2002 by the Bush Administration, recommended the 
development of minimum standards for driver’s licenses by the states.24 Two years later, 
The 9/11 Commission Report included a recommendation for secure identification 
standards established by the federal government: 
Secure identification should begin in the United States. The federal 
government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and 
sources of identification, such as drivers licenses. Fraud in identification 
documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to 
vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources of 
                                                 
24 The White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Office of Homeland 
Security, 2002), 49. 
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identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they 
say they are and to check whether they are terrorists.25 
In December 2004, President Bush signed into law the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act, or the National Intelligence Reform Act, in response to the 
September 11 attacks. The Act required that “the Secretary of Transportation, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall by regulation, establish 
minimum standards for driver’s licenses or personal identification cards [generally, ‘ID 
cards’] issued by a State for use by Federal agencies for identification purposes.”26 
Before publishing regulations, the Secretary of Transportation was required to establish a 
negotiated rulemaking committee to include state representatives. The Act required 
federal agencies to stop accepting non-compliant licenses and ID cards two years after 
the standards were promulgated. Additionally, the Secretary of Transportation was 
required to provide grants to the states to facilitate their compliance with the 
requirements. It also amended the Social Security Act to prevent SSNs from being 
displayed on driver’s licenses or ID cards, and prohibits them from being included within 
machine-readable technology (MRT), such as a magnetic strip or bar code.27 
In May 2005, the REAL ID Act was signed into law as part of the Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriation for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief 
Bill. The Act maintained the same requirements for minimum standards, but added 
provisions for document and immigration status checks, provided more detail and 
guidance on implementation, and repealed specific sections (as discussed in the following 
sections).  
                                                 
25 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 390. 




1. REAL ID Act Overview 
The REAL ID Act has a number of stipulations for document requirements, 
issuance requirements, and requirements relating to the security of the data and 
documents, among others. These requirements are further explained in this section. 
a. Document Requirements 
The Act required that the following minimum data elements appear on all driver’s 
licenses and ID cards that would be accepted for federal use:  
 The person’s full legal name  
 The person’s date of birth  
 The person’s gender  
 The person’s driver’s license or personal identification card number 
 A digital photograph of the person 
 The person’s address of principal residence 
 The person’s signature28 
The Act required the following technology and security features be included on 
the cards: 
 Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, 
or duplication of the document for fraudulent purposes 
 A common MRT, the card must not extend longer than eight years and 
cards that do not meet the specified standards must have a “unique design 
or color,” as well as explicitly state “on [the] face [of the card] that it may 
not be accepted by any Federal agency for federal identification or any 
other official purpose.”29 
b. Issuance Standards 
In addition to the document requirements, the Act mandates a series of standards 
required for issuing the licenses or identity cards. An applicant for a license or card must 
                                                 
28 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 109th Cong. 
29 Ibid. 
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present the following documents, which the state must confirm the authenticity of by 
verifying their validity with the issuing agency: 
(A) A photo identity document, except that a non-photo identity document 
is acceptable if it includes both the person’s full legal name and date of 
birth. 
(B) Documentation showing the person’s date of birth.  
(C) Proof of the person’s social security account number or verification 
that the person is not eligible for a social security account number. 
(D) Documentation showing the person’s name and address of principal 
residence.30  
The Act requires states to validate that applicants are lawfully present in the 
United States to prevent illegal immigrants from receiving a driver’s license. To do so, 
state DMVs must agree check the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) 
system for legal status of all applicants who are not U.S. citizens.31 They must only issue 
temporary licenses and ID cards to these individuals, with an expiration date that 
corresponds to their authorized length of stay. The expiration date and the fact that the 
card is temporary must be clearly visible on the card.  
c. Other Requirements 
The Act contains a series of other requirements relating to security standards, data 
retention, employee training, and motor vehicle databases.  
 Security—Two additional security requirements are that the location 
where the cards are produced must be physically secure and the materials 
used to create them must also be protected. Individuals who manufacture 
the cards must undergo a security clearance.  
 Retention—The Act requires the retention of the physical copies of source 
documents and that a facial photo be captured for each applicant and 
stored in a transferable format. 
                                                 
30 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief. 
31 While many states call the agency that conducts vehicle registrations and issues driver’s licenses a 
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), it is not true of all states. Some referred to this agency as a bureau, 
office, or division. For clarity, this thesis refers to all state agencies as DMVs. 
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 Training of Employees—The Act requires that states establish trainings to 
enable employees to recognize fraudulent documents. 
 Motor Vehicle Databases—The Act requires that all states must “maintain 
a State motor vehicle database that contains, at a minimum, all data fields 
printed on drivers’ licenses and identification cards issued by the State” 
and drivers’ histories (which must include “motor vehicle violations, 
suspensions, and points on licenses”). States must then have “electronic 
access” to each other’s databases.32 
The Act repealed the requirement that the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) issue grants to states to relieve some of their monetary burden. 
Instead, the issuance of grants is now at the Secretary’s discretion. Finally, the Act 
repealed the requirement for a negotiated rulemaking committee. Now, the “authority to 
issue regulations, set standards, and issue grants” belongs to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, “in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the States.”33 The 
Secretary of Homeland Security is also responsible for determining when states have met 
the requirements and issuing them a certificate to show that they have done so. States 
were required to comply with the requirements by May 11, 2008; after that date, federal 
facilities would no longer accept non-compliant driver’s licenses and ID cards for official 
uses, to include “accessing Federal facilities, entering nuclear power plants, and boarding 
federally-regulated commercial aircraft.”34  
DHS published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register in 
March 2007 asking for public comment on their proposed regulations.35 This publication 
occurred two years after the Act was passed in May 2005 and it generated significant 
concerns from the states, which were required to comply with the Act by May 2008, but 
                                                 
32 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., “REAL ID Frequently Asked Questions for the Public,” accessed June 11, 2015, 
http://www.dhs.gov/real-id-public-faqs. 
35 Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies 
for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10820–10858 (March 9, 2007). 
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still did not have the final requirements from DHS.36 Ten months later, the Final Rule 
was promulgated on January 2008, instructing the states in specific requirements that 
they would need to implement to comply with REAL ID regulations.37 It established a 
May 11, 2011 deadline for compliance. DHS later expanded the compliance date to 
January 15, 2013.38 Since then, DHS has granted extensions annually to states that have 
shown continued progress towards compliance. A revised Final Rule was published on 
December 29, 2014 that changes the deadline for “document enrollment” to October 1, 
2020.39 This phrase refers to the date after which federal agencies will no longer accept 
for official purposes a driver’s license or identification card that is not REAL ID 
compliant and is not issued by a certified state. 
d. REAL ID Act Purpose 
The REAL ID Act states that the official purpose of REAL ID compliant driver’s 
licenses and identification cards, “includes but is not limited to accessing Federal 
facilities, boarding federally regulated commercial aircraft, entering nuclear power plants, 
and any other purposes that the Secretary shall determine.”40 DHS considers the REAL 
ID Act a useful tool in fighting terrorism. As stated in the Proposed Rulemaking for the 
Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by 
Federal Agencies for Official Purposes,  
The primary benefit of REAL ID is to improve the security and lessen the 
vulnerability of federal buildings, nuclear facilities, and aircraft to terrorist 
attack. The rule would give states, local governments, or private sector 
                                                 
36 Jim Harper, “Testimony regarding SB 262 and the U.S. Federal REAL ID Act: Committee on 
Transportation New Hampshire State Senate,” CATO Institute, accessed June 23, 2015, http://www. 
cato.org/publications/testimony/testimony-regarding-sb-262-us-federal-real-id-act. 
37 Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies 
for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5272–5340 (January 29, 2008). 
38 Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies 
for Official Purposes, 76 Fed. Reg. 12269–12271 (March 7, 2011). 
39 Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies 
for Official Purposes, 79 Fed. Reg. 77836–77838 (December 29, 2014). 
40 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief. 
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entities an option to choose to require the use of REAL IDs for activities 
beyond the official purpose defined in this regulation.41 
While not considered official purposes, a wide range of ancillary benefits the 
government expects to see includes: 
 Reducing identity theft 
 Reducing unqualified driving 
 Reducing fraudulent access to government subsidies and welfare programs 
 Reducing illegal immigration 
 Reducing unlawful employment 
 Reducing unlawful access to firearms 
 Reducing voter fraud 
 Possibly reducing underage drinking and smoking42 
The federal register notice also notes—in regards to the official purpose—that, 
“DHS, under the discretionary authority granted to the Secretary of Homeland Security 
under the Act, may expand this definition in the future.”43 
2. What Is the REAL ID: A National Identity Management System, a 
National ID Card, or Neither?  
In the United States, literature on the REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses and 
identity cards indicates a range of opinions on the Act’s role in national identity 
management. Some authors assert that the REAL ID is a national ID system, while others 
state that the REAL ID has created a “de facto” national identity card or a “de facto” 
national identification scheme, national identity system, or nationwide identity system. 
Still others say that REAL ID does not constitute a system, but is paving the way for one 
                                                 
41 Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies 
for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10845 (March 9, 2007). 
42 Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies 
for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10846 (March 9, 2007). 
43 Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies 
for Official Purposes, 72 Fed. Reg. 10823 (March 9, 2007). 
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to appear in the future. Finally, some state that the REAL ID is not a system, nor will it 
facilitate the creation of any future system.44 
a. The REAL ID Is Not a National ID Card or a National Identity 
Management System 
The government is the primary voice stating that the REAL ID driver’s license 
and identity card is not part of a national identity management system. The DHS REAL 
ID Frequently Asked Questions for the public specifically addresses this question. It 
states:  
REAL ID is not a national identification card. States and territories will 
continue to issue driver’s licenses and identification cards, and there is no 
Federal database of driver information. Each jurisdiction will issue its own 
unique license and maintain its own records.45 
This statement is in line with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created 
DHS. It explicitly stated that the agency was not authorized to create a system or card: 
SEC. 1514. NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM NOT 
AUTHORIZED.  
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the development of a 
national identification system or card.46  
When asked at the Transatlantic Homeland Security Conference in September 
2004, Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge stated that the Department would not 
develop a national ID card. He elaborated that, “The legislation that created the 
Department of Homeland Security was very specific on the question of a national ID 
card. They said there will be no national ID card.”47 However, Secretary Ridge 
mentioned the Department was working with state governors to create standards for 
driver’s licenses, as they are “probably the most frequently reached for form of 
                                                 
44 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); Department of 
Homeland Security, REAL ID Frequently Asked Questions for the Public. 
45 “REAL ID Frequently Asked Questions for the Public.” 
46 Homeland Security Act of 2002. 
47 Tom Ridge, “Transcript of Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge at the Center for 
Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University ‘Transatlantic Homeland Security Conference’,” 
Department of Homeland Security, accessed August 10, 2015, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=475404. 
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identification.” He explained, “We are constrained from developing a national ID card, 
but not constrained from trying to develop some just basic standards, that regardless of 
the kind of card you issue -- transportation worker, nuclear worker, federal employee -- 
there will be some basic information on it that we can all refer to and consider as 
reliable.”48 It is clear from the Secretary’s remarks that the Department considers a 
national identity card to be one issued by the federal government. Cards issued 
individually by the states, but requiring the same data, would not be considered national 
identity cards in the government’s eyes. 
b. The REAL ID Is Not a National Identity Card, but May Lead to a 
National Identity Management System 
Some academics and civil rights advocacy groups express the view that REAL ID 
driver’s licenses and identity cards are not national identity cards, but may lead to a 
national identity system.49 In her overview of the debate surrounding the REAL ID Act 
and voter identification, J.D. Candidate Debra Milberg states, “REAL ID pushes the 
nation one step closer to a national identification card that requires personal information 
to be stored in a central database.”50 Expressing a similar sentiment, during the 2007 
hearing on the REAL ID Act and Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), 
American Civil Liberties Union Washington Legislative Office Director Caroline 
Fredrickson noted her view of the options facing Congress for the future of the REAL ID 
Act:  
                                                 
48 Ridge, “Transcript of Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge at the Center for Transatlantic 
Relations at Johns Hopkins University ‘Transatlantic Homeland Security Conference’.” 
49 Debra Milberg, “National Security Surveillance and National Authentication System: The National 
Identification Debate: “REAL ID” and Voter Identification,” I/S: A Journal of Law & Policy for the 
Information Society 3, no. 3 (Winter 2007), 443–472; Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, The Impact of Implementation: A Review of the REAL ID Act and the Western 
Hemisphere Travel Initiative, Senate, S. Hrg. 110-555 Cong., 110th Cong., 2 (2008), 1. 
50 Milberg, “National Security Surveillance and National Authentication System: The National 
Identification Debate: “REAL ID “and Voter Identification,” 443–472. 
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Along one path Congress can choose to do nothing and the Real ID Act 
will limp along for the next decade gradually creating the backbone for a 
National ID card system.51 
This testimony conceptualizes the “National ID card system” to include a broader 
set of systematic identification, including the WHTI and enhanced driver’s license (EDL) 
programs. More reticent in his statements on what the REAL ID Act accomplishes, 
Professor Steinboch states, “If the Act, which takes effect in 2008, does not actually 
establish a de facto national identity card it certainly makes the prospect of one 
increasingly likely.”52 
c. REAL ID Is a “De Facto” National Identity Card or Part of a “De 
Facto” National Identity Management System 
Many academics, privacy and civil liberties minded politicians, and advocacy 
groups, have called the REAL ID driver’s license a “de facto” national identity card, or 
acknowledged the nexus between the two.53 In her 2009 article, “Tinkering Towards a 
National Identification System: An Experiment on Policy Attitudes,” Valentina Bali, an 
Associate Professor at Michigan State University stated, “The REAL ID Act of 2005 has 
sought precisely such a profound regulatory transformation, bringing the United States 
closer to a de facto national identification system based on state driver’s licenses.”54 
While Bali’s statement indicates the belief that the United States does not have a national 
identification system yet, the rest of the article closely aligns REAL ID driver’s licenses 
and identity cards with national identity cards. Bali noted the role of driver’s licenses in 
identification, stating, “In the United States the Social Security card and, more distinctly 
so, the state’s driver’s licenses and personal identification cards have acted as the 
                                                 
51 Oversight of Government Management, The Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, The Impact of 
Implementation: A Review of the REAL ID Act and the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, Senate, S. 
Hrg. 110- 555 Cong., 110th Cong., 2 (2008), 1. 
52 “Fourth Amendment Limits on National Identity Cards,” 296. 
53 This includes the U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing Machinery 
(USAMC); Cameron, “USACM Questions Real ID Act’s Security Standards,” Association for Computer 
Machinery U.S. Public Policy Council (USACM), April 5, 2005, http://techpolicy.acm.org/blog/?p=240. 
54 Valentina Bali, “Tinkering Toward a National Identification System: An Experiment on Policy 
Attitudes,” Policy Studies Journal 37, no. 2 (May 2009): 236. 
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effective identification cards.”55 Driver’s licenses are the most commonly used 
identification in the United States and are used in many governmental and business 
transactions.56 Bali’s acknowledgement that driver’s licenses have acted “as the effective 
identification cards” in the United States, while not defining what constitutes a national 
ID card, has essentially established the context in the article that driver’s licenses are 
national ID cards.57 Furthermore, the study asked Michigan residents about their opinions 
on the REAL ID Act, but first asked them about their approval or disapproval of national 
identity cards without mentioning the REAL ID Act; thus, implying the nexus between 
national identity cards and the REAL ID Act. 
d. The REAL ID Is a National Identity Card and Creates a National 
Identity Management System 
The REAL ID has been called a “national ID system” based on three tenants 
called the “hallmarks of a national ID,” that it is “national in scope,” is “used for 
identification,” and “is legally or practically required.”58 The claim that it is national 
scope is based on the fact that although personal data is maintained in individual state 
databases, the REAL ID requirement for the states to be able to access each other’s data 
essentially creates a federal requirement and unites the systems on a national level. The 
prevalence of driver’s licenses, and the necessity that an individual obtain one to drive, 
make them a practical requirement for much of the country. The requirement that licenses 
not be issued to illegal immigrants is also seen as “moving the license into the realm of a 
national ID card.”59 
It would be remise not to point out some of the contradictions occurring between 
the model created by Clement et al., discussed in Chapter I, and the discourse 
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surrounding SSNs and REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses. While the authors of the 
article consider the combination of architectural elements (to include a unique identifier 
[identity number], no physical token [no ID card], and a database) to be a type of national 
identification,60 and specifically cite the SSN as an example of this type of national 
identity architecture, the U.S. government does not see it as such. In fact, steps have been 
taken to prevent the SSN from being considered a universal identifier. The U.S. 
resistance to universal identifiers is explained in further detail in Chapter IV, which 
outlines cultural and historical factors surrounding the identity card debate.  
In contrast to the government’s intention for the SSN, Ya Ni and Tat-Kei Ho 
conceptualize the SSN as a type of ID and consider it to be part of the “de facto national 
identification system” for the United States, while acknowledge that they were not 
“designed for national ID purposes.”61 These academics consider a “national identity 
system” to be so basic as to simply require a “database and communication system that 
establishes and maintains specific information on every individual, including 
characterizes such as U.S. citizenship, state residence, or criminal record.”62  
e. Summary 
Academia has a more nuanced view of the REAL ID Act than other stakeholders, 
as scholars have different opinions as to where the Act falls in the spectrum of national 
identity management models. This discrepancy illuminates a definitional issue. Having 
different understandings and beliefs about what constitutes a national identity card or a 
national identity management system, means that no two individuals or groups will think 
about schemes in the same way. The impact of definitional confusion, on real world 
policymaking, yields schemes that are conceptualized differently, but ultimately, face the 
same challenges.  
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B. UNITED KINGDOM—IDENTITY CARDS ACT 
In 2002, the U.K. government began a public consultation on whether it should 
create an “entitlement card scheme.”63 It did so through the publication of a white paper, 
“Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud: A Consultation Paper,” in which the government 
introduced the main ideas behind how a system would work and solicited public 
comment. The scheme would, in essence, be a national identity management system that 
would involve the public’s use of national ID cards to confirm their identity for a wide 
variety of purposes that would benefit the U.K. citizens and residents, government/public 
sector, and the private sector.  
The forward of the initial public consultation document, written by Home 
Secretary David Blunkett, begins with a reference to the September 11 terrorist attacks in 
the United States. Mr. Blunkett writes that he was asked if the United Kingdom would 
implement the use of identity cards following the attack. He states that the identity card 
system developed would focus on citizenship and entitlement services over national 
security. This emphasis can be seen in the government’s stated benefits of the card: 
(i) provide people who are lawfully resident in the U.K. with a means of 
confirming their identity to a high degree of assurance; 
(ii) establish for official purposes a person’s identity so that there is one 
definitive record of an identity which all Government departments can use 
if they wish; 
(iii) help people gain entitlement to products and services provided by 
both the public and private sectors, particularly those who might find it 
difficult to so do at present;  
(iv) help public and private sector organisations to validate a person’s 
identity, entitlement to products and services and eligibility to work in the 
U.K.64 
In this original conceptualization of the scheme, the system would depend on the 
use of existing photo-ID, such as a “photocard” driver’s license, the newly announced 
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passport card, or a low-cost non-driving license entitlement card.65 Information held on 
the card would also be contained in a centralized database, which would be interoperable 
with other government databases. The system would be voluntary, rather than required or 
“compulsory,” meaning that the public would not need to participate or carry around 
identity cards.66  
The government conducted two additional consultations from April through July 
2004.67 In November of that year, the government introduced the Identity Cards Bill into 
Parliament. A slightly different version was re-introduced in May 2005 after the general 
election.68 It passed in March and the Identity Cards Act (2006) became law.69 Several 
years after its inception, the developing system was given the name of the NIS by the 
government.70 
1. Identity Cards Act Overview 
Like the REAL ID Act, the Identity Cards Act created a legal framework for the 
national identity management scheme, leaving specific details to be defined later through 
regulation.71 The statutory purpose was two-fold. The scheme created a “convenient 
method for individuals to prove their identity” and “provide[d] a secure and reliable 
means of identifying individuals” when it is in the public interest to do so.72 Public 
interest is defined in the Identity Cards Act as for the purposes of: 
 National security (including the prevention of terrorism) 
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 Prevention and detection of crime (including identity fraud and theft) 
 Enforcement of immigration controls 
 Enforcement of prohibitions on unauthorised working or employment 
 Efficient and effective provision of public services73 
a. National Identity Register 
As anticipated, the Identity Cards Act established the National Identity Register, a 
centralized database for which the Secretary of State is responsible for maintaining. The 
database would include a total of 50 data elements, referred to as “registrable facts,” for 
individuals inside the United Kingdom, including the following: 
 Full name and any other names the individual has gone by 
 Gender 
 Date of birth, place of birth, and/or date of death (if individual is 
deceased) 
 Identifying information including photograph including the head and 
shoulders, signature, fingerprints, and other biometric information 
(including an iris scan) 
 Address—current and for all past residences inside and outside the United 
Kingdom 
 Nationality 
 Immigration status 
 Identification numbers and documents associated with that individual74 
 An audit record of who and when information in the Register about the 
individual was provided to another person or body 
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 Other information included at a person’s request75  
Neither medical information, nor criminal records would have been included in 
the Register.76  
The Act stated that individuals who had reached the age 16 and resided in the 
United Kingdom would be able to apply to be entered into the Register. It was intended 
that individuals would have legally resided in the United Kingdom for at least three 
months to be eligible for registration, including foreign nationals.77 In addition, the Act 
was flexible in allowing for the Secretary of State, through regulation, to allow 
individuals who had resided in the United Kingdom in the past to apply for entry into the 
Register.78 Each person’s identity would be checked against passport, driving license, 
and immigration databases before being added to the Registers to confirm that each entry 
belongs to a unique individual to prevent duplicate entries.79 Following their addition to 
the Registry, individuals would be assigned a unique number called the national identity 
registration number.80 The Act also required individuals to apply for inclusion in the 
Register if they were applying for a “designated document.”81 What constituted a 
designated document was left open to be determined by the Secretary of State, but was 
intended to include passports.82 The Act did not require individuals to register, called 
“compulsory registration.” Doing so would require future legislation.83 It does however, 
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set specific requirements for individuals “subject to compulsory registration,” showing 
that the government did intent to pursue this avenue in the future.84 The Act was always 
intended to be the basis for a compulsory scheme.85 
b. ID Cards  
The scheme involved the issuance of an identity card (ID card) to individuals who 
registered. While not specified in the Act, it was later determined that the individual’s 
data would be held on both the ID card and in the Register. The Act also specified that 
certain information on the cards would be encrypted and that different people may have 
different validity periods.86 In addition, the Identity Cards Act amended legislation to 
allow ID cards to become a type of travel document similar to a passport.87 The 
government had not set a date for when the cards would become compulsory; however, 
compulsion would require additional Parliamentary approval. Still, it was never intended 
for individuals to be required to carry them at all times.88  
c. Scheme Provisions 
In addition to promulgating the physical architecture of the scheme, the Identity 
Card Act stipulates a number of provisions that describe how the scheme will function 
and the services it will provide. 
(1) Requirement to Provide Information. To keep the information in the 
Register accurate, the Act gave the Secretary of State and designated documents 
authorities the ability to require individuals with ID cards to provide updates to the 
government when their personal information changed. It was the individual’s 
responsibility to keep their information up-to-date once they were added to the Register, 
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which included their current address. This requirement did not apply to individuals in the 
Register who were not issued ID cards.89 
(2) Identity Verification. The Act specified that the scheme would involve an 
identity verification service, which would have provided specific information from the 
Register to a requesting party to confirm the individual’s identity.90 A requesting party 
was intended to include both public and private sector organizations (e.g., a government 
agency or business).91 An accreditation process would have needed to be established so 
that only approved parties could make these requests, but they could only do so with the 
individual’s consent.92 In addition, the Act stated that regulation could be promulgated 
“to make public services conditional on identity checks.”93 Public services were defined 
broadly and could extend beyond National Health Service (NHS) services to, for 
example, the issuance of firearms certificates.94 The Act limited what information could 
be provided to requesting agencies.95 For example, an individual’s biometric information 
(e.g., fingerprint) may not be provided, but confirmation that the biometric information 
submitted by the requestor matches that on file for the individual may be provided.96 
(3) Oversight. The Act established NIS Commissioner, who was responsible 
for reviewing operational decisions made by the Secretary of State and designated 
documents authorities and for reviewing the uses of the ID cards.97 Specific to the 
operation of the scheme, the Commissioner was responsible for “securing the 
confidentiality and integrity of the information” in the Register as well as dealing with 
complaints.98 The Commissioner was required to report to the Secretary of State and 
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Parliament annually.99 The Act also gave the Intelligence Services Commissioner 
responsibility for oversight of the intelligence services’ use and interaction with the 
Register.100 
(4) Allowable Uses. The Act allowed the data in the Register to be shared 
with national security and intelligence agencies to carry out their functions without the 
consent of the individual in question. These agencies included the Security Services, the 
Secret Intelligence Service, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), 
and the Serious Organized Crime Agency.101 Information could also be shared with a 
chief officer of police or Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs “in the 
interests of national security; for purposes connected with the prevention or detection of 
crime; or for other purposes specified by order made by the Secretary of State.”102 The 
Commissioners were also allowed to receive information for functions relating to 
national insurance contributions and for other purposes connected to their mission.103 
Finally, information could be shared with a specified government department or a 
Northern Ireland department for the purpose of carrying out their functions.104 
(5) Criminal Offenses and Civil Penalties. The Act created a number of new 
criminal offenses including the possession, use, or creation of false identity documents 
issued by the United Kingdom or other countries (e.g., ID card, passport, driving license, 
immigration document, etc.); the “unauthorized disclosure of information” from the 
Register; “providing false information” for inclusion in the Register; and “tampering with 
the Register.”105 In addition to criminal offenses, the Secretary of State may issue civil 
penalties, or fines, to ensure compliance with the Act.106  
(6) Fees and Costs. Through regulation, the Act allowed the Secretary of State 
to impose fees in relation to the scheme, such as for issuing ID cards or for confirming 
information in the register.107 To keep track of the costs of the scheme, the Secretary of 
State was required to report to Parliament, six months after the Act was passed, the 
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anticipated cost of the scheme over the next 10 years.108 The Secretary would be required 
to report on the cost every six months after that. 
d. Identity Cards Act Purpose 
The U.K. government—specifically the Home Office—cited a variety of potential 
uses for the card in their initial consultation document, “Entitlement Cards and Identity 
Fraud: A Consultation Paper,” which would benefit the government and public sector, 
U.K. citizens and residents, and private sector businesses. The focus of the scheme is 
very different from that of the REAL ID Act. The system purpose is primarily to prevent 
and combat identity theft and facilitate entitlement to services; the focus on terrorism is 
ancillary. As Home Secretary David Blunkett, wrote in the Forward: 
After the terrorist atrocities in the United States on 11 September 2001, I 
was asked whether the Government was considering introducing identity 
cars. I said at the time that any debate about identity cards should not 
centre exclusively on issues of national security. Far more important are 
the issues of citizenship and entitlement to services and it is in this context 
that I would like to see the debate unfold.109 
To understand the purposes for the system further, the following sections delve 
deeper into the benefits to the government, and the public and private sectors. 
(1) Individual Purpose: To Create a Convenient Method for Individuals to 
Prove Their Identity. The government intended the scheme to provide a benefit to the 
U.K. residents who would be enrolled in the Register and/or receive an ID card. Since 
private companies were meant to be able to access the information collected, the scheme 
was touted as a simple way for individuals to verify their identity to make secure 
transactions with organizations, such as banks.110 Since address information would be 
collected in the Register, the government proposed that citizens would only need to 
change their address data in one location rather than filling out multiple forms for 
different government agencies.111 The identity card was described as a means for young 
people to validate their age when buying restricted products, such as alcohol, and could 
potentially facilitate travel through Europe.112 
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(2) Societal Purpose: To provide a secure and reliable means of identifying 
individuals when it is in the public interest, in addition to the specific benefits provided to 
an individual U.K. resident, the government has explained a number of ways in which the 
scheme is intended to better society. These benefits broadly include increased security, 
reduced fraud, and enhanced service delivery. 
 Enhance National Security and Facilitate the Prevention and Detection of 
Crime  
One of the purposes of the scheme was to prevent people engaged in or funding 
terrorist and criminal activities from being able to maintain multiple identities.113 The 
ability to maintain different aliases or obtain fraudulent documents helps terrorists and 
criminals conceal their identity and further their enterprises. The scheme was meant to 
prevent these individuals from receiving legitimate government documents. It was also 
meant to prevent identity theft and fraud by making it harder for bad actors to forge 
documents.114 This obstruction would help combat the high costs of identity fraud, which 
a 2002 government estimate found to have cost the U.K. public and private sectors a total 
of 1.3 billion pounds.115  
The scheme would have allowed law enforcement, intelligence, and security 
agencies to track individuals based on a historical record of what organizations are 
requesting a check of the Register. The government anticipated that requests would have 
been made for services, such as renting a hotel room, hiring a rental car, or buying a 
mobile phone. Thus, the government would have been able to reconstruct past locations 
of individuals based on their attempted to purchase these items and services.116  
Additionally, the scheme would have created a large repository of fingerprints 
available to query. Police would have been able to check fingerprints left at the scene of a 
crime, called latent fingerprints, against the holdings of the Register to help identity 
suspects.117  
 Facilitate the Enforcement of Immigration Controls and Prohibitions on 
Unauthorized Working or Employment 
The system was intended to eliminate the “pull factor” that brought immigrants 
into the United Kingdom, particularly the perception that they would be able to easily 
obtain benefits and services once they entered into the country.118 The government states 
that illegal migration results in lost tax revenue and forces the agencies to contend with 
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fraudulent benefit claims.119 Those who facilitate the entry of illegal workers into the 
United Kingdom are often tied to organized crime—like trafficking—or are engaged in 
other criminal activity. The scheme is conceptualized to reduce this activity.  
Additionally, another potential benefit of the scheme was to assist the government 
in prosecuting companies that hired workers illegally, as those companies could no longer 
rely on the excuse that they did not understand how to read the myriad of European 
Union immigration documents.120 The scheme was considered a benefit to would-be 
migrant workers, as its enforcement was said to provide protection to those who would 
have been working for very little money in poor conditions by preventing this situation 
from occurring.121 Finally, the scheme was proposed to aid companies by creating an 
easier, more centralized way for them to validate the immigration status of job applicants 
and employees.122 
 Efficient and Effective Provision of Public Services 
As stated previously, service delivery can be understood to be the most significant 
purpose of the scheme. This concept is referring to facilitating government services to the 
public; it was to be a means of efficiently validating individuals’ identity to ensure their 
entitlement to goods and services.  
In the United Kingdom, situations in which it is statutorily required that an 
individual provide identification extend beyond claiming benefits. They also include 
accepting “a place in Higher Education, applying for a student loan, or in applying for 
social housing.”123 In addition, the Act stated that when it became compulsory for certain 
populations of individuals to register, those individuals would be required to produce 
their ID card for public services that were free of charge (e.g., free non-emergency NHS 
treatment) or to receive a government payment (e.g., social security benefits).124 
The clear benefit to the government was to have access to a definitive record of an 
individual’s identity.125 The scheme could also aid in the facilitation of e-government, or 
government services provided over the Internet, a benefit to both the public sector and the 
private citizen.126  
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The scheme was also suggested to benefit the private sector commercially. It 
would help companies respond to their customers more efficiently and prevent them from 
having to spend valuable time reviewing personal information on forms filled out by 
customers.127 The consultation paper proposed that having a single definitive way to 
confirm customers’ identity would create a cost savings, but did not explain how. The 
paper did, however, propose that the identity card could create a cost savings by 
becoming the vehicle that companies could use to facilitate their loyalty programs, rather 
than producing their own cards.128  
2. What Is the National Identity Scheme? A National Identity 
Management System, a National ID Card, or Neither?  
The system developed in the United Kingdom has been called a NIS, national 
identity card scheme, or simply referred to as a national identity card or an entitlement 
card. 
With the plethora of academic constructed models for identity management 
architecture, it is easy to see why a level of ambiguity exists in the literature on identity 
cards and the literature on identity management systems. This confusion is readily 
apparent in the discourse that surrounded the U.K. identity management scheme.  
As described earlier, the name of the bill that began the development of the 
national identity management system was the “Identity Cards Bill.” Similarly, many of 
the consultation papers conducted by the Home Office have titles that include the terms 
“entitlement cards” or “identity cards.”129 In fact, a study conducted by several 
professors into public attitudes on the identity card implementation scenarios in the 
United Kingdom found that acceptance of national identity cards declined when subjects 
were specifically asked how they would feel about an implementation plan that would 
include storing their information in a centralized database, rather than only having the 
information stored on the card (with that information “backed up on a computer held by a 
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trusted third party such as a bank, police station, or [lawyers’ office]”).130 They found 
that, “The results of the present study suggest that potential users of an identity card are 
aware of the potential security risks of a centralized database, and find a distributed 
approach more acceptable.”131 When prompted with the concept of a database (whether 
centralized or held by a third party), the support for identity cards decreases regardless of 
who maintains the database. This finding supports the idea that people do not 
immediately associate ID cards with a database; these two components are 
conceptualized as being different entirely.  
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III. POLICY AND PRIVACY CONCERNS  
The factors and tensions, drivers and inhibitors found in the discourse surrounding 
the REAL ID Act stipulations for driver’s licenses and identity cards and the U.K. NIS 
are actually quite similar. They tend to highlight the tensions that exist between privacy 
and security and between convenience and intrusiveness.132 In looking at the similarities 
between detracting arguments, this chapter begins with examining the privacy and policy 
concerns surrounding these schemes. From this basis, the chapter establishes evidence of 
the similarity between opposing arguments to national identity cards and schemes 
characterized as being national identity management systems. 
A. PURPOSE CONCERNS 
One of the questions posed by scholars and academics is whether the REAL ID 
Act and the NIS would actually accomplish the purposes for which they were created. In 
this regard, the arguments against both approaches are similar. 
1. Schemes Will Not Enhance National Security or Prevent Terrorism 
For both schemes, academics and privacy and civil liberties advocates have 
questioned whether the ID cards will actually improve national security, prevent 
terrorism, and increase safety. Privacy advocacy groups are quick to point out that little 
empirical research is available on the effects of national identity cards on terrorism 
prevention. As of April 2004, the following statistics existed for assessing the impact of 
national identity cards: 
While a link between identity cards and anti-terrorism is frequently 
suggested, the connection appears to be largely intuitive. Almost no 
empirical research has been undertaken to clearly establish how identity 
tokens can be used as a means of preventing terrorism.  
Of the 25 countries that have been most adversely affected by terrorism 
since 1986, eighty per cent have national identity cards, one third of which 
incorporate biometrics. This research was unable to uncover any instance 
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where the presence of an identity card system in those countries was seen 
as a significant deterrent to terrorist activity.133 
One argument made against both the REAL ID Act and the NIS is that neither 
scheme would prevent terrorism because the adoption of enhanced ID cards will actually 
attract bad actors. REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses and identity cards were posited to 
“entice criminals and terrorists to acquire them” since they are a trusted source of identity 
verification.134 Similarly, those critical of the UK scheme believe that the national ID 
card would further advance criminality: 
Whenever governments attempt to introduce an ID card, it is always based 
on the aim of eliminating false identity. The higher the “integrity” 
(infallibility) of a card, the greater is its value to criminals and illegal 
immigrations. A high-value card attracts substantially larger investment in 
corruption and counterfeit activity. The equation is simple: higher value 
ID equals greater criminal activity.135 
Additionally, the UK national identity card was derided for its inability to prevent 
individuals from doing harm since the government had only assigned a civil penalty of 
2,500 pounds to people who fail to register. The lack of a strong monetary fine created a 
concern among academics that the wealthy, as well as individuals seeking to avoid the 
system, would only need to pay their way out of it. As the London School of Economics 
(LSE) stated, “This fine could effectively become a tax on criminals and terrorists 
operating in the UK.”136 Since visitors and students who remained in the United 
Kingdom for less than three months were not expected to obtain ID cards, some argued 
that this loophole would prevent ID cards from being fully effective.137 
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Another argument made against both schemes is that they will not be able to 
prevent terrorists from committing fraud to obtain valid IDs. This belief relies on the 
assertion that bad actors will find ways to get hold of REAL ID compliant licenses 
fraudulently in the same way that the 9/11 terrorists were able to.138 The ID cards would 
then allow them to operate clandestinely since the cards are considered a highly trusted 
and secure form of documentation. The use of legitimate documentation to circumvent 
the system is known as logical avoidance and could become a preferred strategic 
measure, given terrorists’ proclivity to operate under their own names, as noted by 
Privacy International:139 
Almost two thirds of known terrorists operate under their true identity. 
The remainder use a variety of techniques to forge or impersonate 
identities. It is possible that the existence of a high integrity identity card 
would provide a measure of improved legitimacy for these people.140 
Opponents of the national identity schemes argue that those operating under their 
true identities could also evade the system through physical avoidance. In doing so, 
terrorists may instead choose to target locations that do not require identification, such as 
malls.141 This assumption is not unrealistic, considering that threats by such terrorist 
groups as Al Shabaab have already been made toward public spaces like the Mall of 
America.  
2. Schemes Will Not Prevent Identity Theft 
Critics in the United States have argued that the REAL ID Act will attract identity 
thieves due to the valuable personal information contained within the DMV databases.142 
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U.K. opponents have noted that the centralization of data in the National Identity Register 
could lead to increased instances of fraud: 
Centralised identity systems often give rise to fraud through the abuse of 
centralised data either by insiders (staff) or outsiders (malicious 
hackers).143 
The creation of a unique identifier, namely the national identity registration 
number, also raised concern that it could exacerbate the identity theft problem since, “In 
some cases, the use of unique identifiers for citizens has become the key enabler of 
identity theft.”144 The same concern exists for the unique identifier associated with a 
REAL ID license or identity card, as its reliability may increase its use in the private 
sector, and thus, it could gain the same value in enabling fraudulent transactions as the 
SSN.145 
In addition to these arguments, the LSE strongly questioned the NIS’ ability to 
reduce identity theft noting that its 1.3 billion-pound cost to the U.K. economy—that the 
government increasingly touted as an important reason for the scheme—depended on 
different definitions of identity fraud, not all of which would be prevented by the 
introduction of an identity card.146 
3. Schemes Will Not Reduce Illegal Immigration or Unlawful 
Employment  
Finally, opponents argued that the schemes would not reduce illegal immigration 
or unlawful employment. One of the concerns within the United States is that the REAL 
ID will “undermine national security by pushing immigrants deeper into the shadows and 
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forcing many to drive without licenses.”147 In the United Kingdom, it was argued that if 
the existing framework of legislation for tackling unlawful employment was not 
effective, then an ID card would not solve the problem.148 The LSE commented: 
The only measures that could change the situation are a compulsion on all 
individuals to carry ID cards in order to permit spot-checks by the Home 
Office, a requirement on all employers to report, and a requirement to 
verify the data against the national register.149 
However, a requirement for compulsory registration was never established before 
the scheme was disbanded and the legislation expressly prohibited the requirement that 
individuals carry the card with them. 
B. PRIVACY CONCERNS 
A number of privacy concerns are associated with both schemes. Many have to do 
with how the scheme will function or how data collected will be used, maintained, and 
protected. 
1. Function Creep 
Large repositories of data are valuable tools that allow federal government 
agencies to accomplish their respective missions. Due to this value, privacy advocates 
have raised concerns that the schemes will suffer “function creep.” In other words, the 
system would eventually be used for purposes beyond what it was originally intended for 
and data would also be used for purposes beyond what it was originally collected for. The 
SSN has been cited as a prime example of function creep, “Initially designed only for 
administering social security benefits, SSNs are now common data elements in public 
and private sector databases, allowing for easy sharing and correlation of disparate 
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records.”150 What was originally a unique identifier for one system is now used to 
identify people in many different systems. 
The expanded use of identity cards and unique identifiers beyond their original 
purpose is exactly the concern that privacy-minded groups have about the REAL ID 
licenses and identity cards and the National Identity System and associated national 
identity registration number. This type of function creep is not an unrealistic expectation. 
In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the Minimum Standards for Driver’s 
Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 
DHS noted the ability to expand the official purpose of the REAL ID Act, stating: 
DHS proposes to limit the regulatory definition of “official purpose” at 
this time, to those purposes expressly stated in the Act—accessing Federal 
facilities, boarding commercial aircraft, and entering nuclear power plants. 
DHS, under the discretionary authority granted to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security under the Act, may expand this definition in the 
future.151 
In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, DHS requested that the public provide 
comments on how the Department could expand the purpose of the ID card to “other 
federal activities.” Privacy advocates have pointed out that even the ancillary benefits 
called out in the NPRM, such as preventing “unlawful access to firearms, voter fraud, and 
possibly underage drinking and smoking,” are beyond the official purpose of the Act, and 
are a further sign that future uses of the cards will extend far beyond what was originally 
intended.152  
As it stands today, some see the REAL ID Act itself as function creep. Driver’s 
licenses were created only to certify that a person is authorized to drive a motor vehicle. 
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The use of the identity card for verifying age or address, or even as a means to prevent 
terrorism, is beyond its original intended purpose.153  
Members of the U.K. Parliament also voiced concerns regarding the potential for 
function creep.154 Multiple times over the course of the scheme’s development and 
implementation, the Home Affairs Select Committee noted their worries, which were not 
without precedent. In a 2004 report, the Committee harkened back to 1939, at the 
beginning of WWII, when a national identity card established for three purposes, had 
expanded to 39 purposes by 1950.155 In 2008, several years after the passage of the 
Identity Cards Act, but before the first ID cards were due to be distributed, members of 
the Home Affairs Select Committee re-visited the issue of the potential expansion of the 
scheme: 
We are concerned…about the potential for ‘function creep’ in terms of the 
surveillance potential of the National Identity Scheme. Any ambiguity 
about the objectives of the Scheme puts in jeopardy the public’s trust in 
the Scheme itself and in the Government’s ability to run it.156 
They requested assurance that the scheme’s purposes would not be broadened 
without first consulting the Information Commissioner, as well as Parliament. The LSE 
noted that if the scheme were to assist the police in the way that they had requested, the 
function of the card would need to be expanded to allow officers to require individuals to 
produce their cards during stop and search procedures. The ability to compel people to 
show their ID cards would also be the only effective way to combat illegal immigration 
using the card.157  
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2. Data Security and Privacy Protections 
Another issue that faced the administrators of both the U.K. NIS and the REAL 
ID Act implementation was concern over data security. Both schemes risk potential data 
breaches, both intentional and unintentional. The risk of data breaches is germane to both 
discussions of national ID systems and ID cards because the information in both will be 
held in a database, whether or not it is centralized (like in the United Kingdom) or 
decentralized in multiple databases (like the U.S. DMV databases that exist for each 
state). 
As it stands, in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the federal government did 
not require that the states meet federal standards for privacy and data security. Privacy 
advocates call this omission a blunder since the NPRM cites Executive Order 13132, 
which states, “[f]ederalism is rooted in the belief that issues that are not national in scope 
or significance are most appropriately addressed by the level of government closest to the 
people.”158 The act of citing that particular Executive Order signals to privacy advocates 
that the federal government does not see privacy as national in scope, a sentiment with 
which they adamantly disagree. Advocates believe that the Privacy Act of 1974, which 
establishes information privacy and security practices that federal agencies must abide 
by, applies to this systematic collection of data because the Privacy Act, “stipulates that 
systems of records operated under contract or, in some instances, State or local 
governments operating under Federal mandate ‘by or on behalf of the agency… to 
accomplish an agency function’ are subject to the provisions …of the Act.”159 In this 
argument, the databases operated by each state for collecting information on drivers to 
fulfill the requirements of the REAL ID Act are seen as a wider system of records.160  
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Not all advocacy groups feel that the REAL ID Act is detrimental to privacy, 
however. Some groups say that the REAL ID Act increases privacy protections by 
increasing the physical security of DMV production facilities and requiring more 
stringent background checks for workers.161 In addition, they highlight the fact that the 
data has not been consolidated into a single centralized federal database and left to the 
states to maintain in separate databases.162  
The NPRM issued by DHS for REAL ID standards leaves the states to work out a 
collective governance structure, business process, and data access rules. All states are 
currently required to check applicants against the National Driver Register 
(NDR)/Problem Driver Pointer System (PDPS) and the Commercial Driver’s License 
Information System (CDLIS). The NDR is a database of information on “problem” 
drivers in all 51 jurisdictions and the PDPS allows users to query the NDR database.163 
The PDPS also acts as a pointer system that notifies the user of the individual’s state of 
record (SOR), which contains their driver status and history information. The PDPS is 
maintained by the U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Transportation 
Safety Administration (NHTSA).164 The DHS Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the 
REAL ID Act notes that the PDPS adopts principles of the Privacy Act of 1974 including 
“individual participation and collection, use, and disclosure limitation.”165 While CDLIS 
has more limited privacy protections, DHS states that no known privacy issues exist with 
how it is implemented.166  
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Similarly, the Identity Cards Act did not address security for the National Identity 
Register database.167 With the proposed system being unprecedentedly large at the time, 
the question of how to secure the information was greatly important. The system would 
have needed to be “highly secure to protect the data it holds from unauthorised access or 
modification and to protect the privacy, safety and security of the millions of citizens 
identified in its records.”168 Academics and other advocacy groups questioned the 
government’s ability to safeguard the information based on prior instances of information 
technology (IT) security failure. These failures included the Child Support Agency, as 
well as Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), which lost the personal data of 
every child in Britain, in addition to their guardian’s national insurance numbers and 
bank account information, in 2007.169 This loss totaled the records of 25 million 
individuals.170 
3. Data Integrity 
Data integrity—the accuracy, consistency, and reliability of data—is key to large 
databases.171 Data must be reliable if it is to be used for decision-making; without 
confidence that the data in the system is accurate, all decisions based on the data are 
suspect. Poor data integrity has the potential to jeopardize and compromise the entire 
endeavor.172  
In the United Kingdom, since data is critical for the scheme’s purpose of the 
verifying an individual’s identity to make a decision about that individual, academics 
expressed concern over how inaccuracies in citizens’ data, through no fault of their own, 
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would affect them.173 Since the card was designed to limit access to public services, 
individuals may be excluded from receiving services they are authorized to receive if 
they do not have their card. This situation could occur if an individual was waiting for a 
replacement for a card that had been lost or stolen or that needed to be updated based on 
new information (such as a new address).174  
In the United States, beyond a general concern over accuracy of the data, 
advocacy groups are specifically concerned over the decision not to standardize the 
mechanisms for correcting records. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking indicates that 
states will need to adopt the fair information practice principles (FIPPs), privacy 
principles at the heart of the Privacy Act of 1974, to receive DHS certification that they 
are fulfilling the requirements of the REAL ID Act.175 One of the principles is the data 
quality and integrity, which includes the correction and redress of records.176 Privacy 
advocates feel that the requirement for adopting the FIPPs is not enough, since privacy 
and security go hand in hand.177 They believe the full federal privacy standards, as 
specified in the Privacy Act of 1974, should be applied to the states to create uniform 
redress standards: 
Full application of the Privacy Act requirements to government record 
systems is the only way to ensure that data is accurate and complete, 
which is especially important in this context, where mistakes and 
misidentifications are costly.178 
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Without consistent procedures, privacy advocates say that standards for each state 
will be created independently, which would result in different criterion for adjudication 
and confusion for individuals seeking redress.179 
4. Linking of Databases/Expanded Sharing of Data 
Officials in the United States and the United Kingdom faced additional concern 
over the linking of databases—which expands the sharing of data—for both privacy and 
IT security reasons. In the United Kingdom, advocacy groups and academia were 
concerned over the linking of government and private sector databases to the National 
Identity Register.180 The U.K. government envisioned that connecting existing 
government databases to the Register would be a way to obtain further facts that 
individuals could confirm about themselves, thus acting as additional sources of 
verification.181 Conversely, advocacy groups were concerned that connecting multiple 
government databases with the Register would decrease privacy for the U.K. citizen. As 
the U.K. legislative framework for the government’s use of personal information strongly 
protects the individual, the pursuit of data sharing with other agencies represents a break 
from tradition.182 In one example of this intended partnership, the Home Office voiced a 
desire to obtain legislative provision for sharing data with the U.K. Passport Service 
(UKPS) and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) to facilitate identity theft 
and fraud prevention.183  
The future commercial use of the scheme was just as concerning to these groups. 
The U.K. government anticipated that the scheme would be utilized by the private sector 
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as a way for businesses to verify the identity of an individual. In this way, corporations 
could verify work authorization to prevent illegal working, as well as reduce fraud.184 
Groups were concerned that corporations, such as financial institutions or airlines, would 
eventually require the card to use their services.185 
In the United States, many groups opposed linking the DMV databases, as 
required by the REAL ID Act. The primary argument against this provision was that 
connecting the databases would decrease the overall security of the system. Civil liberties 
groups believed that the requirement would make it easier for hackers to access the data 
in all databases, while only having to hack into one.186 This connectivity was even 
characterized to be “more insecure than creating a large centralized database in terms of 
safeguarding the data” by IT Security expert and author William Eyre.187 He further 
explained: 
it has the level of intrusiveness of a national ID database in that the data is 
all in one place (logically or virtually, as opposed to physically) by virtue 
of the ability to search distributed databases from multiple entry points. In 
computer parlance, to say it is logically in one place means that according 
to the computer’s logical instructions, it matters not if all of the 
information is physically in one computers system…The computer’s logic, 
with the connections that the computers make with each other, and the 
speed of access and the speed with which the data can be moved from one 
computer to another, has the net result that the database is one “logical” 
entity.188 
5. Increased Collection of Data (Type and Amount of Data Held) 
One of the arguments against the U.K. and U.S. schemes is that they increase the 
amount of data collected by the government so much so that the collection becomes an 
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invasion of privacy. U.K. advocacy groups expressed a concern over the amount of data 
the Register would hold, some of which they felt was overly intrusive, like prior 
addresses and immigration status.189 The scheme was also characterized as constituting a 
change in the relationship between the government and the individual: 
Of course the [Identity Card Act 2006 (IDCA)] does not by itself signal 
the end of personal privacy in the UK. However, it does symbolize a shift 
in the approach of the state towards the collection of information. It is 
arguable that we are moving away from a society where information is not 
shared unless necessary, towards one where it will be shared unless there 
is a reason not to.190 
In the United States, privacy advocates have the same concern, although there has 
been some debate about whether the amount of data collected and retained has 
increased.191 Some advocates say that the government’s requirements call for an 
increased collection and retention, although the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
published by DHS contends that no increase has occurred:192 
A frequently-heard concern relates to the amount of additional information 
the Federal Government will have about driver’s license holders and what 
the Federal Government will do with that data. In fact, however, neither 
the Real ID Act nor these proposed regulations gives the Federal 
Government any greater access to information than it had before.193  
However, advocacy groups say that DHS is incorrect in its assertion: 
DHS claims that it is not expanding data collection and retention, but it is 
enlarging schedules and procedures for retention and distribution of 
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identification documents and other personal data. This broad expansion of 
data collection and retention in a national database creates significant 
threats to privacy and security.194 
These groups note that all state DMV databases must now include all fields from 
licenses and identity cards, as well as fulfill the requirement for collecting and retaining 
identity documents for up to 10 years.195 These documents include SSNs, birth 
certificates, and citizenship documents, all of which are currently maintained in separate 
authoritative systems, but would be consolidated under a state’s DMV to comply with the 
REAL ID Act.  
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IV. CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES CONCERNS 
This next chapter draws parallels between the civil rights and civil liberties issues 
found in both the REAL ID Act implementation and the NIS. Civil Rights are “basic 
rights and freedoms granted to citizens of a country,” that have “traditionally revolved 
around the basic right to be free from unequal treatment based on certain protected 
characteristics (race, gender, disability, etc.).”196 Civil liberties can be defined as 
“freedom from coercive or otherwise intrusive governmental actions designed to secure 
the national against real or, sometimes, imagined internal and external enemies.”197 The 
opposing arguments to both schemes based on these concerns are outlined in the 
following sections. 
A. RACIAL PROFILING AND DISCRIMINATION 
In the United Kingdom and the United States, advocacy groups expressed concern 
that the schemes could increase the potential for racial profiling, which is the 
“consideration of race, ethnicity, or national origin by an officer of the law in deciding 
when and how to intervene in an enforcement capacity.” In the United Kingdom, the 
police themselves expressed concern about the potential for racial discrimination by 
police officers since the very first iterations of identity management schemes were 
introduced. 
Discussions of a national identity card scheme began long before the Identity 
Cards Act. The idea was discussed as early as 1994, and the Home Secretary introduced a 
voluntary scheme in 1996 as a tool to assist police in fighting crime and fraud. Prior to its 
introduction, policing organizations voiced support for a voluntary scheme, but they, as 
well as the government, expressed concern over the potential negative effects that “a 
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compulsory scheme may have on the relationship between the police and ethnic minority 
groups.”198  
In fact, the U.K. police consistently voiced opposition to making a scheme 
compulsory before and after its 1996 introduction for this reason.199 They were acutely 
aware of the public’s concern over the potential for abuse by police officers, specifically 
the concern that prejudiced behavior would manifest itself in officers disproportionately 
stopping members of minority populations and requiring them to produce an ID.200 The 
end result would be increased discrimination against minority populations. Furthermore, 
civil rights groups and police officers believed that the scheme would eventually evolve 
into a de facto compulsory scheme, without legislative authority, as they believed officers 
would come to rely on the card and could potentially treat individuals without the card as 
suspicious.201  
In recent years, the U.K. police have actively supported the voluntary NIS as they 
have done in the past. However, organizations that previously only supported a voluntary 
scheme, such as Association of Chief Police Officers, have changed their mind, possibly 
due to the heightened security threats facing Britain:202 
The overwhelming view within ACPO is that the ID card scheme should 
operate on a “compulsory” and “universal” basis. Whilst we understand 
the rationale behind the proposed incremental approach we believe there 
are benefits to be accrued if individuals were required to carry or produce 
the card upon request to an appropriate authority. Those engaged in 
criminal activity will not be deterred if the scheme is not robust.”203 
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In discussions of the NIS, police have cited the benefits of cards in improving 
stop and search procedures, as it will allow officers to verify the identity of individuals 
quickly using their ID cards.204 They state that using mobile readers to scan an 
individuals’ ID card will allow them to identify individuals in violation of Anti-Social 
Behavior Orders (ASBOs) or Football Banning Orders expeditiously, both of which 
prevent individuals from visiting particular locations.205 Police anticipate that the cards 
will ultimately increase safety and security.  
Ironically, stop and search procedures using the national ID cards were noted as 
an area of concern early on in the NIS’ implementation as they augment insecurity in 
minority populations due to their potential for abuse. In its review of the Identity Cards 
Act, the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) felt that discrimination could occur in 
four areas, including “police stops and searches, service provision and employment, 
disclosure without consent, [and with] gypsies and travelers.”206 The CRE expressed 
concerns regarding the statistically disproportionate use of stop and search procedures on 
ethnic minorities. They believed that once the scheme became compulsory, as was 
intended by the government, this situation would only be exacerbated with police 
requiring a disproportionate number of minority individuals to display their cards.207 The 
CRE also felt that the Secretary of State’s power to “provide information without the 
consent of the individual” could lead to increased racial or religious profiling and noted 
that the requirement to provide an address or face fines will negatively impact gypsies 
and travellers, cultural and ethnic communities in the United Kingdom, some of which 
are nomadic.208  
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In the 2003–04 session, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee agreed 
with CRE that “the Bill should be accompanied by a full Race Impact Assessment and 
that there should be a further Assessment at the time of the move to compulsion.”209 The 
chair of the Commission for Racial Equality “argued that there was little hard evidence 
about the impact of an identity card scheme on different ethnic groups and communities 
in the United Kingdom, but experience in other European countries was not 
encouraging.”210  
The government conducted a partial race equality impact assessment for the 
scheme in 2004 to identify major issues. They found the scheme to be non-discriminatory 
because it was applicable to everyone residing in the United Kingdom for longer than 
three months.211 The assessment noted that the scheme must comply with the Race 
Relations Act 1976 as amended by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, meaning 
that it “must have due regard to the elimination of unlawful racial discrimination, the 
promotion of equal opportunities and good relations between people from different racial 
groups.”212 The document registered the same concern as many of the advocacy and civil 
rights organizations representing ethnic minority groups regarding the government’s 
stipulation that individuals present their ID cards to receive services: 
People from black and minority ethnic groups might be asked to provide 
the card as proof of identity more frequently than white people which in 
some cases might lead to people being denied access to services to which 
they are entitled if they cannot produce their card.”213  
This concern is compounded when discussions of the card turn to its broader use 
in society: 
There were concerns that the cards will be used detrimentally due to 
institutional racism existing in public and private service authorities, 
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particularly where there was a reliance on discretion. A view expressed 
was that, in this context, a compulsory scheme would be less 
discriminatory as everyone would be able to produce a card.214 
In a similar vein, within the United States, advocacy groups warn that because 
holders of REAL ID driver’s licenses and identity cards have been verified to have U.S. 
citizenship, those who do not obtain cards but “look foreign” will be subject to increased 
scrutiny and discrimination.215 In addition, they believe that the REAL ID Act will result 
in increased identity checks for minorities and foster a climate of suspicion against those 
without IDs, “Failure to carry a national I.D. card would likely come to be viewed as a 
reason for search, detention or arrest of minorities.”216 
B. TRACKING INDIVIDUALS 
Due to concerns about the potential ability of the government or commercial 
entities to track individuals based on the data they provided, ethnicity was not a field the 
U.K. government planned to record in the National Identity Register or on the face of the 
ID card. As part of the scheme, an audit trail would have been recorded for every check 
of the National Identity Register; every query made by government agencies, as well as 
future commercial entities, would be captured and stored indefinitely.217 The data 
recorded for each check of the database is known as transactional data, which is “data 
that records events taking place between individuals, groups, and organisations.”218 
Advocacy groups were concerned about what might be done with the data, noting, 
“Personal identity data combined with historical and transactional data held about the 
individual would make it theoretically possible for government to build behavioural 
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profiles of its citizenry.”219 Since U.K. citizens are some of “the most monitored in the 
world,” privacy-conscious individuals believe the combination of closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) with transactional data could be taken advantage of by future 
authoritarian governments.220  
In the United States, advocacy groups have the same concerns as in the United 
Kingdom that citizens could be tracked based on their race, which would increase the 
potential for discrimination against them. These groups were troubled by the fact that the 
government had not taken steps to prevent race from being recorded on the driver’s 
licenses and identity cards, as the U.K. government had when they decided not to record 
ethnicity on the National Identity Register or on the cards. 
In the proposed rulemaking, DHS stated that it considered five different types of 
MRT.221 These included a 1D bar code, a 2D bar code, an optical stripe, a contact 
integrated circuit chip, and a contactless integrated circuit chip.222 Ultimately, they 
selected the PDF-417 2D bar code as it is the most common MRT standard and is already 
used by 45 states.223 DHS also proposed the standard data elements consist of the 
majority of the data elements found in the 2005 American Association of Motor Vehicle 
Administrators (AAMVA) Driver’s License/Identification Card Design Specifications, 
Annex D: 
The AAMVA list of data elements includes expiration date, bearer’s 
name, issue date, date of birth, gender, address, and a unique identification 
number. DHS proposes that States consider storing in the machine-
readable zone (MRZ) only the minimum data elements necessary for the 
purpose for which the REAL IDs will be used.224 
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Race/ethnicity is an optional data element in the 2005 AAMVA driver’s license/
identification card design specifications. Civil libertarians were particularly concerned 
about the potential inclusion of this field, as demonstrated in the written remarks from 
Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies for libertarian think-tank, The CATO 
Institute, at a 2007 Congressional hearing on the REAL ID Act:  
DHS does not require all the data elements from the standard, and it does 
not require the “race/ethnicity” data element, but the standard it has 
chosen will likely be adopted in its entirety by state driver licensing 
bureaus. The DHS has done nothing to prevent or even discourage the 
placement of race and ethnicity in the machine readable zones of this 
national ID card.225 
Scholars have noted that while DHS addressed the concern in the final rule for the 
proposed regulations—stating that “the AAMVA standard was not intended to include 
race as a data element in the MRZ for REAL ID”—it did not explicitly prevented its 
inclusion.226 States still retained the ability add other data elements into their state 
licenses and identity cards, including the race/ethnicity field, as they saw fit.227 
The concern about DHS’s refusal to prevent race from being recorded on state 
driver’s license and ID cards was compounded by DHS’ decision not to mandate the 
encryption of data stored on the 2D bar code, the MRZ located on the cards. DHS 
considered requiring encryption to increase the security of data stored on the cards and 
reduce the privacy risk.228 If the MRZ is not encrypted then retailers can collect any data 
stored on the card when it is swiped at their businesses. The data about the individuals, 
along with their purchase history, can be used by that company or packaged and resold to 
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other companies.229 Privacy and civil liberties groups recognized that the lack of 
encryption, and the ability of companies to access the data, could result in commercial 
entities tracking an individuals’ race, which they could then use to discriminate against 
them: 
in May 2008, many Americans may start carrying nationally uniform 
cards that include race or ethnicity in machine-readable formats. This will 
be available for scanning and collection by anyone with a bar code reader. 
Government agencies and corporations alike may affiliate racial and 
ethnic data more closely than ever before with information about our 
travels through the economy and society.230  
In fact, the standardization of the MRT and the data elements makes skimming 
this information even easier. Prior to the REAL ID Act, states had different types of MRT 
on their licenses and identification cards. Privacy groups have argued that uniformity in 
the technology and the data held on the cards will increase the likelihood that cards will 
be used in more contexts, primarily due to the economies of scale for commercial entities 
in purchasing card readers and software. The standardization of driver’s licenses and ID 
cards will mean that all cards from any state could be scanned by a single card-reader, 
which makes it cost efficient for commercial entities to invest in them to record and use 
the data.231 Despite these concerns, DHS decided not to propose the encryption of the 
MRZ because of the technical and security complexities involved in enabling law 
enforcement to decrypt the data.  
C. SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 
The creation of identity cards is viewed as contributing to the development of a 
surveillance society. The U.K. Information Commissioner defined the surveillance 
society as the following: 
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The surveillance society is a society which is organised and structured 
using surveillance based techniques. To be under surveillance means 
having information about one’s movements and activities recorded by 
technologies, on behalf of the organisations and governments that 
structure our society. This information is then sorted, sifted and 
categorised, and used as a basis for decisions which affect our life 
chances. Such decisions concern our entitlement and access to benefits, 
work, products and services and criminal justice; our health and well-
being and our movement through public and private spaces.232  
Surveillance was further defined as: 
Where we find purposeful, routine, systematic and focused attention paid 
to personal details, for the sake of control, entitlement, management, 
influence or protection, we are looking at surveillance.233 
As previously mentioned, the REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses and identity 
cards and the U.K. national identity card were criticized for their intrusion into personal 
privacy and their impact on free movement since they can be tracked by the government 
and commercial entities. Recording an individual’s personal data can have additional 
unintended effects on personal privacy and civil liberties and can increase the potential 
for discrimination. Social sorting and profiling from the use of data mining are two ways 
that a person’s civil liberties can be impacted. 
Social sorting is the act of analyzing and categorizing personal information in 
databases to “define target markets and risky populations.”234 This practice of digitally 
segmenting the population can have unintended consequences, in which certain groups 
receive different opportunities. The purposes of the card, such as the prevention of 
terrorism and identity fraud, lend themselves to the establishment of dichotomies of 
people within the system (i.e., terrorist/non-terrorist, legitimate beneficiary/fraudulent 
beneficiary) and can further disadvantage already disenfranchised groups:235 
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Terrorist suspects are likely to be members of minority groups; claimants 
to government benefits and services are likely to be already disadvantaged 
and immigrants, whether legal or not, are also in positions of relative 
powerlessness. The social sorting of new IDs touches the lives of the 
weakest and most marginalized member of the population.236 
In addition, the report, “Surveillance Society,” warned that data mining poses the 
danger of inadvertently grouping individuals into stigmatized categories. Data mining is 
“the mass automated profiling and matching of otherwise innocuous information to throw 
up anomalies that might indicated some illicit behavior is taking place.”237 It can be used 
by the government as a way of determining who may be up to no good: 
Significantly, use of data-mining and profiling to identify risks shifts 
surveillance practices toward the screening of the actions and transactions 
of the general population. This screening can then be used to target 
interventions on people or groups of people who are considered to be at 
risk or to pose risks for others.238 
However, scholars note that these practices can lead to racial and religious 
profiling.239 Some argue that data mining can reduce the potential for discrimination if it 
is a computer, rather than a human, that generates the profile used based on past 
behaviors of terrorists, which thus removes human bias from the equation.240 However, 
human judgment is still required at the onset in deciding who constitutes a known 
terrorist.241 Furthermore, data mining can also cause people to be deemed a potential 
threat simply based on their similarity to others who have committed criminal acts.242 It 
is a shortcoming of law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts scholars say, because it 
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focuses entirely on prior patterns of behavior, while failing to imagine the potential for 
future adversaries that do not fit the existing profile.243  
It is important to note that a fine line exists between profiling and intelligence-led 
identification; the first is based on a generalization of people in a specific group, while 
the other is based on behavior consistent with perpetrating crime that police are trying to 
prevent.244 It is profiling, rather than intelligence-led identification, that concerns 
advocates as “profiling to identify people as potential criminals’ risks treating all people 
who it a certain profile as potential terrorists or criminals.’”245  
Moreover, some believe profiling is not very effective. Legal scholar and former 
U.S. Court of Appeals judge Richard Posner argues that racial profiling does not reduce 
the amount of crime occurring, but only creates a shift in who is committing it as 
heightened scrutiny of one group will pave the way for another group to step in to the 
“open market.”246 Similarly, he argues that racial profiling will not prevent terrorism 
because these groups will simply change whom they chose as operatives to avoid scrutiny 
and prevent detection.247 Due to the ability of criminals and terrorists to thwart the use of 
profiling by law enforcement and the intelligence community, the benefit is minimal 
compared to the harm and alienation felt by minority communities.  
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V. PUBLIC RESPONSE  
This chapter focuses on the public’s reception of and reaction to the REAL ID Act 
in the United States and the NIS in the United Kingdom. Specifically, it explores issues 
surrounding government transparency, public engagement, public acceptance, and the 
historical and cultural factors that informed the discussion of the REAL ID Act and NIS. 
The chapter discusses how both schemes encountered a lack of public debate and 
government transparency and how this lack has affected their political success. It 
explores the schemes’ levels of public acceptance and how public support is affected by 
discussions of how the scheme will actually function. Finally, it explains how cultural 
and historical factors have demonstrated a resistance to identity management policies, 
which has manifested itself throughout the development and implementation of the 
REAL ID Act and National Identity Scheme. This resistance may again prove to be an 
impediment to lasting success.  
A. PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency is key to the public’s adoption of a system: 
Research has shown that a lack of transparency and accountability in the 
collection and use of personal information may create high levels of 
distrust. This lack of trust can, in turn, affect the adoption and use of 
information-collecting technologies, such as smart cards.248 
Furthermore, the public’s acceptance of a system is critical to the systems’ success: 
Many consider the acceptance of biometric systems by users groups an 
important requirement for success. It is believed that without user 
acceptance, perfectly functioning systems are doomed to fail.249 
Both the U.S. and U.K. schemes experienced a lack of public engagement in the 
development of the foundational legislation. In general, the lack of public debate and 
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government transparency proved to be a political stumbling block that threatened the 
success of both schemes throughout their implementation.  
The REAL ID Act did not get the benefit of public scrutiny. When the legislation 
was passed in 2005, it was included as part of a bill for military spending and aid to 
countries affected by the December 2004 tsunami and March 2005 earthquake, as well as 
by the Avian influenza virus.250 As such, it passed quickly without debate. Opponents of 
the Act argued that it was not politically feasible for Congressmen to oppose the bill and 
were critical of the fact that the REAL ID Act language was appended after the bill 
passed the House, which prevented discussion or the potential to amend the text.251 In the 
month prior to the Act’s passage, 12 Republican and Democratic Senators wrote a letter 
to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist asking him to oppose the inclusion of the REAL ID 
language in the emergency supplemental spending bill. Instead, they asked him to refer 
the legislation to the Senate Judiciary Committee for discussion and debate. They wrote, 
“Legislating in such a complex area without the benefit of hearings and expert testimony 
is a dubious exercise and one that subverts the Senate’s deliberative process.”252 
While the Republican-controlled House Judiciary Committee argued that the 
Senate had the chance for debate during the year prior when most of the provisions were 
included in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (they were taken 
out for the bill to pass the Senate), privacy advocates dismiss that claim as “procedural 
maneuvering” and cite the lack of hearings during that time.253 
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Academics note the quick passage of the bill and lack of public debate meant that 
lawmakers did not have time to build support for the policy: 
[W]hile the Bush administration was very effective in capitalizing on the 
national mood and policy circumstances to get the law passed, it never 
allowed sufficient open debate of the policy to shake up the policy 
subsystems and soften (but not silence) the opposition, nor was it effective 
in building a strong, long-lasting coalition to support the policy change.254 
Furthermore, the lack of sustained support is detrimental to the long-term success 
of a policy: 
As the multiple streams policy literature suggests, national crises may 
offer a window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to get a policy on 
the agenda or even to get it passed under a certain national mood. 
However, they may be insufficient to sustain a policy shift in the long run 
unless policy entrepreneurs also invest time and political capital to realign 
the established interests. The development of the Real ID Act also affirms 
why a major policy shift often takes decades to build up momentum in a 
democratic system. Policy options have to be sorted out, debated, 
evaluated, and examined critically by diverse groups and all these need 
time. The translation from an idea to a policy can be painfully slow, but 
rushing it through the political system can actually be counterproductive 
and may risk policy backpedaling later.255 
The lack of public debate partially explains the continued opposition from state 
governors and legislatures. In 2007, the Maine legislature passed a resolution refusing to 
implement the law, becoming the first state to do so.256 It was not the only one. Many 
states have either passed resolutions or legislation to resist compliance, petitioned DHS to 
repeal or revise the minimum standards, or just flat out refused to participate.257 DHS 
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repeatedly and deliberately interpreted letters from governors expressing how they would 
be implementing standards for their states—independent from the minimum standards 
dictated in the Federal Register—as requests for extensions.258 Still, the Department is 
able to say that currently, 54 out of 56 jurisdictions are in compliance—with 31 of those 
having an extension until January, October, or June 2016; only two are considered to be 
non-compliant.259 However, the requirement for having a REAL ID-compliant driver’s 
license or identity card to board an aircraft has been delayed to no sooner than 2016.260 
While Congress believes that the residents of non-compliant states fault their governors 
and legislatures, opponents say that Congress, DHS, and the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) will be recognized as the source of the problem when the ID 
requirement for domestic flights comes to pass.261 
In the United Kingdom, it was argued that while the government held several 
consultations to solicit public input, the process of democratic participation was 
conducted superficially.262 The government’s plans for the architecture of the scheme, 
including the national centralized database (the National Identity Register), a consistent 
and permanent identifier (National Identity Registration Number), and the inclusion of 
biometrics on the ID card, did not change at all throughout the process.263 Apart from 
discussions regarding the inclusion of medical information on the card, the government 
did not appear genuinely to evaluate the public’s suggestions or input on how to structure 
the scheme.264 In spite of the lack of impact the public consultation had on the scheme, 
the legislation still benefited from several years’ worth of debate that included expert 
testimony and in-depth analysis, which the United States did not have. 
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However, the LSE studied the scheme intensely and found that the government 
had not built a “foundation of public trust and confidence.”265 While several public 
consultations had been held prior to the Identity Card Act’s passage, the government’s 
lack of transparency into how the scheme’s cost was calculated created mistrust in the 
general public, who were not convinced that the government could prevent the scheme 
from running over budget. The LSE developed and publicized an independent cost 
estimate far higher than the Home Offices’. While the Home Office believed the scheme 
would cost about £5.84 billion over a 10-year period, the LSE estimated the cost to be 
between £10.6 billion and £19.2 billion.266  
This discrepancy and the controversy surrounding it caused the Home Office to 
bring in an independent contractor, KPMG, to review. The independent analysis did not 
increase transparency, however, as the government was unwilling to disclose its costing 
model to Parliament, stating that the details were “commercial confidential.”267 
Eventually, the scope of the government’s cost parameters was revealed during a public 
meeting; it proved to be significantly narrower than the LSE’s. This disclosure informed 
the public that the cost of the scheme would be far greater than the original estimate 
provided by the Home Office. In response, one of the Parliamentary Houses approved an 
amendment to delay implementation until the scheme’s full costs were presented and 
approved.268  
In sum, both schemes demonstrated a lack of public engagement, whether 
intentionally through an accelerated passage of the law, as occurred in the United States, 
or perhaps unintentionally by failing to adjust the scheme adequately to address major 
public concerns brought up in consultation, as occurred in the United Kingdom. While 
the lack of public engagement was just one factor that led to the repeal of the U.K. 
scheme, it remains to be seen whether or not the U.S. government has generated enough 
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momentum to sustain the policy of requiring REAL ID compliant licenses and identity 
cards for entering federal facilities—and boarding commercial aircrafts—on a long-term 
basis.  
B. PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE 
The current level of public support for the REAL ID Act is difficult to determine. 
Few national opinion polls have been conducted within the United States; these few have 
been funded by industry trade organizations, which casts doubt on the objectivity of the 
results. A poll conducted in 2007 by Public Opinion Strategies, funded by the 
Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), found that 82 percent of adults 
favored the “new national rules and regulations regarding state-issued driver’s licenses 
and identification cards designed to help prevent terrorism, identity theft and other 
crimes.”269 
More data available is available on American opinions of national identity cards. 
Polling has shown that the level of approval for national ID cards is similar to that in the 
United Kingdom. A 2001 poll conducted by Pew Research Center, found that 70 percent 
of Americans favored the adoption of a national ID card, which was an all-time high for 
the country.270 By August 2002, that support had dropped to 59 percent and remained 
steady at 57 percent during polls conducted in January and December 2006.271  
Additionally, research has shown that when fees are brought to the public’s 
attention, support for the scheme decreases. In a 2006 study of Michigan residents, only 
40 percent of respondents supported the validation and storage of documentation by the 
state when it was noted that this provision could heighten costs and wait times.272 
Overall, the study found that 61 percent of respondents supported the introduction of a 
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national ID card, while 69 percent supported the REAL ID Act.273 However, at the time 
of the study, the REAL ID Act regulations had not yet been implemented, and as such, 
the author noted that Americans may not have known much about the legislation and that 
public opinion could change.274 Since then, no national polls about national identity cards 
or the REAL ID Act have been conducted.275 
In the United Kingdom, despite the concern over cost, the public’s support for the 
NIS was generally very high throughout its implementation until the scheme was 
repealed. Polls administered in 2003 and 2004 by groups for and against the scheme 
revealed around an 80 percent approval rating.276 Although the general public supported 
the scheme in the polls, it was questionable how much they understood about it. A 2004 
poll showed that 73 percent of British people knew “just a little” to nothing about the 
scheme.277 Only 5 percent knew “a great deal.” The lack of general knowledge is 
unsurprising, considering that the U.K. government spent more time deciding how it 
would enroll biometrics, focusing its marketing efforts on companies that could help 
them in this endeavor, than on informing the general public of how the scheme would 
benefit them.278 The lack of focus on the scheme’s intended uses was another reason that 
critics questioned whether the scheme was just a “massive government data collection 
exercise.”279 
Additionally, when the public was asked about specific parts of the scheme, their 
trust clearly waned.280 This trend indicated support for the general purposes of the 
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scheme (e.g., preventing terrorism, reducing illegal working, preventing identity theft, 
etc.) but not necessarily how the government was going about achieving those goals.281 
As in the United States, disapproval manifested when polls focused on costs, particularly 
when the public was asked about paying for the ID card and about the fines associated 
with not informing the government of their new address, in the event that a person 
moves.282  
Academics also found a discrepancy in the level of support for the scheme. A 
2005–2006 study of U.K. citizens and residents focused on the type of database proposed 
and what the authors describe as the “level of compulsion” involved. The study’s 
participants were asked how they felt about the use of a centralized database in the 
scheme, versus an architecture without a centralized database, in which personal 
information “would be held on [an ID] card and backed up locally in a secure database 
maintained by a trusted third party (e.g., a bank, police station, or [lawyers’ office].”283  
Respondents also were asked how they felt about a registration process that was 
very structured, which the authors called “high compulsion,” versus a registration process 
that was very flexible, termed “low compulsion.” Participants received instruction that 
high compulsion meant that individuals would be given an exact time and place to 
register their personal and biometric information, and would incur a fine if they failed to 
appear.284 Low compulsion meant that individuals could visit a location of their choosing 
at the time of their choosing to provide personal information and a biometric of their 
choosing (e.g., a fingerprint, facial photograph, or iris scan).285 The authors found that 
“the largest shift against ID cards was when the level of compulsion was high (e.g., no 
choice when to go for the biometric scanning, possible fines) combined with a centralized 
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government database.”286 This approach was the scheme proposed by the U.K. 
government. The survey also found that “regardless of the type of implementations 
scenario, attitudes towards ID cards moved toward the ‘against’ end of the scale 
following the scenarios.”287 This datum lends credence to the theory that the public 
supports the scheme without fully understanding how it will be implemented; once 
people have a better understanding of how the scheme will function, and what they will 
be required to do, support decreases. 
C. CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL FACTORS 
National identity schemes, identity cards, or unique identifiers have historical 
context within the United Kingdom and United States that carry negative connotations for 
their citizens and residents. While the United States has never implemented a national 
identity management scheme, Americans have a history of rejecting the 
institutionalization of unique identifiers when they sense that the potential impact to the 
privacy and security of an individual’s information—if compromised—has become too 
great. A prime example is the response to the SSN over time. Created in 1939 as an 
account number for the Social Security System, its use has greatly expanded through the 
years.288 Despite its ubiquity, significant efforts have been made to prevent the SSN from 
being considered a universal identifier. When the Privacy Act of 1974 was drafted, a 
provision was included that explicitly prevented government agencies from denying 
individuals their lawful rights, benefits, or privileges if they refused to provide their 
SSN.289 Congress added this provision due to the concern over the large amounts of 
personal data they saw being linked to a single identifier. It was thought that by including 
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this language, fewer people would provide their SSN if not required, and thus, fewer 
agencies would use it as an identifier.290  
Later in 1977, the U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission issued a report 
entitled, “Personal Privacy in an Information Society,” in which the Commission 
described their fear that “a government record system, such as that maintained by the 
Social Security Administration or the Internal Revenue Service, will become a de facto 
central population register unless prevented by conscious policy decisions.”291 The 
Commission recommended, “the Federal government should act positively to halt the 
incremental drift toward creation of a standard universal label and central population 
register.”292 
In 1993, the Clinton Administration introduced the National Health Security Plan, 
under which all Americans would be issued a health security card with associated health 
security ID numbers.293 This effort ultimately failed in part due to privacy concerns over 
the government’s ability to protect the security of the data and due to the potential for 
individuals to be tracked based on their ID numbers.294 Finally, as mentioned in Chapter 
II, Congress added language to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to preventing it from 
being construed as an authorization for developing a national identification system or 
card. 
In contrast, the United Kingdom has a history of using identity management 
schemes during wartimes. The concept of a national identity management scheme was 
first introduced in 1915 at the end of World War I. The National Registration Act (1915) 
established a register of all adults in the United Kingdom between the ages of 15 and 65 
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to organize the workforce and enforce military conscription.295 Each citizen was given a 
certificate of registration. A 1918 Amendment to the law required that citizens provide 
certificates to police officers or authorized persons when asked.296  
The next wartime scheme was developed in the 1930s at the onset of World War 
II. The United Kingdom passed the National Registration Act (1939), which required all 
civilians to carry identification cards with them at all times and produce the card when 
demanded by a police officer.297 The original purpose of the card was to enforce required 
national service in the military, increase security, and assist in food rationing, but its 
purpose was expanded over time.298 In 1945, it could be used to register to vote in the 
general election, and by 1952, 39 government agencies were using the ID card.299  
In 1951, the Act was challenged in court.300 The plaintiff, Clarence Harry 
Willcock, argued that the use of power granted in a national emergency—that is the 
power of the police to require individuals to produce their ID without being accused of a 
crime—was no longer valid because the monarchy had acknowledged already that the 
war had ended.301 While the court ruled against Willcock, one of the dissenting judges 
noted that the Act was being used for purposes well beyond what was originally 
intended.302 The following year, the National Registration Act was repealed.303 
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The late 1980s and early 1990s saw identity card proposals far different from 
those devised while Britain was at war. The Football Supporters Act of 1989, designed to 
reduce violence at soccer matches in England and Wales, proposed a national 
membership system involving the creation of a centralized database (called a “central 
register”) and identity cards issued to spectators.304 ID cards were never issued, however, 
as the scheme was never implemented.305 Six years later, in 1995, the Home Office 
published a consultation document discussing options for issuing identity cards to the 
public.306 The Home Affairs Committee conducted an inquiry, after which it determined 
that making cards voluntary was the best course of action.307 No bill was ever introduced 
however, as there was little focus on the issue politically.308  
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Not all academics, and certainly, not all politicians and government officials 
deciding and developing identity management policies, understand the nuances that exist 
in the definitions surrounding identity management. While the terms “identity cards” and 
“identity management systems” have been favored in the literature, these terms have 
complex definitions and assumptions associated with them. The variation in terminology 
obscures the fact that identity cards that are national in scope face the same problems and 
issues as those experienced by national identity management systems. Using a 
comparative analysis of the REAL ID Act implementation and the NIS, this thesis has 
shown that Anglophone, common-law nations experience the same inhibiting factors, 
whether or not they attempt to implement a national identity management system (like 
the United Kingdom) or an identity card on a national scale (like the United States). The 
two different schemes—one purposefully intended not to be national identity 
management system and the other purposefully intended to be one—ultimately must 
overcome similar issues and establish the same balance between security and privacy. 
The previous chapters have established that there are a wide variety of 
interpretations as to what the REAL ID Act in the United States means when it comes to 
the identification of individuals on a national scale. A number of opinions about whether 
the REAL ID-compliant driver’s licenses and identity cards constitute a national ID card 
or could be considered to be part of a national identity management system have been 
voiced. Despite these definitional issues, a comparison of the U.K. and U.S. schemes 
yields a variety of similar inhibiting factors, the most prominent of which are privacy and 
civil liberties related.  
Advocacy groups, academics, and even politicians have objected to parts of both 
schemes based on similar purpose, privacy, and civil rights and civil liberties concerns. 
They warned that the schemes might not be able to fulfill their proposed purposes. They 
expressed concern over a variety of privacy issues, including the potential for function 
creep, the security and integrity of data collected for the schemes, the implications of 
linking databases together, and the effects of increased collection and sharing of data. 
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Advocacy groups and academics also expressed concern over the potential for increased 
civil rights and civil liberties violations based on the data collected. They worried that the 
schemes could plausibly increase racial profiling and discrimination, through stops and 
searches or through the possible inclusion of race on the identity cards in the United 
States, where the cards’ lack of encryption creates the risk that personal data would be 
collected and used by commercial entities. Furthermore, the concern that the nationwide 
use of identity cards fosters a surveillance society, and facilitates the practices of data 
mining and profiling, is shared by U.S. and U.K. groups. 
Academics in the United States and United Kingdom asserted similar concerns 
regarding the development of their respective legislation. They believed that the process 
was either too accelerated to allow for public debate, or that it was flawed, as the design 
and functional components of the scheme had been decided up front. Both schemes have 
similarly high levels of public acceptance, until it is brought to the attention of the 
participants how the schemes will actually function. Finally, the United States and United 
Kingdom have similar inclinations to reject identity management schemes, identity cards, 
or identifiers based on a varied history of associated personal privacy and civil liberties 
concerns.  
When considering identifiers, it is perplexing to compare the fervor over the 
REAL ID Act to the resistance against the use of SSNs. If all U.S. citizens have SSNs, 
but not all citizens have driver’s licenses, why then has more outrage occurred over 
REAL ID-compliant driver’s licenses and identity cards than SSNs? If everyone actually 
has social security cards, why are they less contested than the driver’s licenses? It is 
because numerous steps have been taken to prevent the social security cards from being 
an identifying document, while acting as an identifying document is precisely the purpose 
of the driver’s license and ID cards as required by the REAL ID Act. The function of the 
document is what drives the opposition. National identity management systems and 
identity cards have the same function.  
The parallel inhibiting factors experienced by both schemes demonstrate that 
while some do not consider the U.S. REAL ID Act to be a national identity management 
system—and thus, may not think of REAL ID-compliant driver’s licenses and identity 
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cards as national ID cards—the nomenclature used to describe the policy does not matter 
when it comes to issues surrounding identity management that must be negotiated and 
overcome. Whatever the name, whatever the architecture, government systems built to 
identify the citizenry of a national will face significant resistance. U.S. policymakers 
must consider the inhibiting factors that face national identity management schemes in 
Anglophone, common-law nations when implementing nationwide identity cards, lest 
they fall into the trap of believing that the same issues will not appear. Only with this 
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APPENDIX A. DATA ELEMENTS IN THE IDENTITY CARDS ACT 
2006 
Appendix A contains the list of data elements intended to be recorded in the 










APPENDIX B. DATA ELEMENTS IN THE AAMVA DRIVER’S 
LICENSE/IDENTIFICATION CARD DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS, 
ANNEX D 
Appendix B contains the list of mandatory and optional data elements found in 
the 2005 American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) Driver’s 
License/Identification Card Design Specifications, Annex D. Mandatory data elements 
were proposed by DHS for inclusion on REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses and 
identity cards in the notice of proposed rulemaking, Minimum Standards for Driver’s 
Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 
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